The role of television in the 1958 Massachusetts democratic gubernatorial campaign. by Kelman, Alfred R
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Dissertations and Theses (pre-1964)
1959
The role of television in the 1958
Massachusetts democratic
gubernatorial campaign.
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/13511
Boston University
= 
THE ROLE OF TELEVISION IN THE 19 58 
1-tlASSACHUSETTS DEIVIOCRATIC GUBEHNATORIAL CAMPAIGN 
A Thesis 
Presented to 
the Faculty of 
the School of Public Relations and Communications 
Boston University 
In Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Master of Science 
by 
Alfred R. Kelman 
August 1959 
APPROVED BY 
First Reader ~. /l. /.~ . .. .. 
/ . • A~stant Professor of Communications 
Secord ReactOr£~. r~~ .... 
Chairman, Communication Arts Division 
I 
= 
AC:Ki'\JOWLEDGENENTS 
A deep expression of gratitude is here voiced to Coleman Bornstein~ 
President of the Young Democrats of Massachusetts, who offered the writer 
the first signs of assurance that he would be able to proceed ~~th his 
proposed study. He also thanks Harold Turin~ Account Executive, Herbert 
Frank Advertising Agency, who reinforced these first signs of assurance~ 
and who gave so freely, in both time and enthusiasm, reliving the campaign 
with the writer . The writer is indebted to Henry Morgenthau III, Special 
Projects Manager, WGBH-TV, Boston, and Anne Fitzgibbon, Massachusetts 
Department of Commerce, both of whom offered such gracious cooperation 
and timely suggestions. His thanks are here expressed to John Mallan, 
E:xecutive Secretary of the Commission on the Audit of State Needs, and 
Paul McGerigle, hea.d of the research staff of Governor Foster Furcolo, for 
their patience in answering endless questions. 
The writer is greatly obliged to Dr. Jerry B. Briscoe, of Boston 
University School of Public Relations and Communications, who constantly 
opened new doors of thought and exploration. Finally, a special note of 
thanks to Dr. David R. Mackey, Chairman, Division of Communication Arts, 
Boston University School of Public Relations and Communications, for his 
constant patience and advice in order to make this study as sequential 
and readable as the writer's ability allowed. 
TABLE: OF CONTENTS 
AC.I<_NOHI EDGEHENTS . • • . . . . . . . " . . . . . . 
LFT OF ILLUSTRATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
INTRODUC' ION . . . . . . . . . . . . . -· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Chapter 
I . ORGill~IZATION ••••••• . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
II . 
III . 
The Steering Conmrit tee 
The Pu.blic Relations Division 
The Advertising Ag ency 
The Film Compa.n~r 
STHATEGIC PREPARATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
The Campaign Plan 
. . 
THE NEDIUH OF TElEVISION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
The Use of a Tele\~sion Program 
The Television Campaign 
The Televisi on Production Process 
The Cost of Television 
IV . ANALYSIS OF THE TELEVISION CAHPAIGN • • • • • • • • • • • • 
v. SUHHARY AND CXH-JCI.JU.'3IONS • • • • • • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
APPENDIX A SA1-1PLE TELEVISION PF!ODUCTION Al'J"'D CONTENT ANALYSIS SHEET • • 
APPENDIX B EXAJv.fPLE OF A FIUDID TELEVISION PROGR!J:.f OF FOSTER FURCOID, 
11 CITIZEN"S11 P.tU-"lTICIPATION" • • • • • .. • . . . . . . . . . . 
APPENDIX C EXA~PLE OF A LIVE TELEVISION PROGH.t\Ivi OF FOSTEH. FURCOID , 
11 VACATIOI'i INDUSTRY" • • • . . . . . . . • 0 . . . • • • 
APPENDIX D SA}fPlli 1\f.Ei,VSPAPER CA.l"IPAIGN .ADVERTISl!:IviENT • . . . . . 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ••••••••••••• • • • • • • • • • . . . . . . . . 
1 
18 
33 
43 
65 
73 
79 
80 
86 
92 
93 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 
Figure Page 
1 . General Organizational Chart of the Headquarters Organization. 19 
2 . Organizational Chart of the Public Relations Division. 20 
3. Frequency Tabulation for Television Saturation • • • • • • 44 
4 . Breakdmm of Television Station Time, Nevlspaper Advertisements 
Promoting TV Programs, and Television Film Production Costs . • 64 
IN"THODUCTION 
In 1956, the Brookings Institution published a 170-page report by 
Charles Thomson entitled Television and Presi dential Politics . To date , 
this is one of the very few publi cations that comprehensively e:h."'}Jlores 
television's relationship to the political process on a national l evel. 
Even less has been written on television' s role in state politics . 
Obviously, then, f'u..rther research and analysis is indicated . 
1-ioreover, the advent of television has substantiaD_y changed the 
political process on both the state and national l evel. As Thomson 
stated: 
No one kno1,Is vr.ith any scientific exactitude what the impact of 
television has been on politics or Hhat potentials it may hold for 
the future . It is certain, however, that the i mpact has already been 
considerable -- on the practice of politicians, of cormnunications 
industries , and of the people at large , if not on voting behavior as 
revealed by action on election day.l 
Thomson 1 s thoughts are I'Vell substantiated by other major v.1ri ters in the 
field such as Stanley Kelley, Jr. 2 and V. 0 . Key, Jr . , 3 vmo have made 
major contributions to our understanding of the nature of campaigning 
and campaigning in the nation today . 
1 Charles Thomson~ Television and Presi dential Politics 
(Washington, D. C. : Brookings Institution~ 1956), p . 1. 
2
stanley Kelley, Jr . , Professional Pub lic Relations and Political 
Povle:r_ ( Baltimore : Jolms Hopkins Press, 1956 • 
3v. o. Key, Jr . , Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups ( New York: 
Thomas Y. Crovlell Co • , 19 58) • 
To understand the change that h.<J.s taken place in t he polit ical 
process , requi!'es a thorough e::·:amination of television, the neY~rest of 
the mass media , and one ''l!:1ich many believe has been the major contributor 
t o this change in our political environment . 
Background to the Problem 
"Public relations men and their close relatives , advertising IT'en, 
have moved into politics in a bi g way . 111 The political coJll.munications 
s · ecialist is needed . 1~hi s is not a pctssing phase of the Ar!l.erica.n 
l · t · 1 A 1 · ' d 1 f h" . · t 2 po l lCcL s cene . so lCl emanc or lS ser·v:J.ces eXJ.s · s . 
The grovTth of the mB.ss media of communications has been 
responsible for the rise and need of the political conummicat ions 
speci8.list . In order to tCJ.ke advantage of this road to pov.rer in 
contemporar y society, the polit icic-m realizes that he must use the mass 
med.ia effectively, but because of their growth he has fotmd this to be an 
enormousl~r intricate endeavor} "TechnoloGical advance has m-9.de political 
conum.mication a highly technic al, if not a professional , field . 114 
Secondly, the expensive cost for the use of t he media has moti1rated the 
politician to er!l.ploy people vlho possess professional sldlls . 5 In a 
l Hilliam Lee Hiller' ucan Government be I Nerchandised I ? 11 ' 
The Reporter, October 27, 1953, p . 11. 
2~t 1 0 ,J Jan~ey Kelley, Jr., op . cit . , p . 2 2 . 
L~Ibid ., p . 20~ . .. 
2 
5u . S . Hous e of Representatives , Ca.mpa.ign Expenditures, Hearings · 
before the Special ComrP.ittee to Investi8ate Campaign 'F:xpendi tures, Pursuant 
to H. Res . 555·, 82d Gong . , 2d Sess . , 1952 (Washington, D.C. : United States 
Govermnent Print ing Office, 1952) , p . 12. 
state campaign alone , the cost for the use of television can rise into 
l the six-figure bracket . 
There can be very litt le doubt, but that the "professional 
politician11 and the "hard-bitten ne1vspaperman, 11 for so many years a 
dominant f orce around campai gn headquarters, are yielding to the 
advertising men and public relations experts . 2 
It is also evident that politicians are employing the aid of 
agencies more than ever before.3 Kelley points out that qualified 
professional people, almost without exception, are mnployed to assist in 
gubernatorial and senatorial campaigns/" and that trj_s change in campaign 
procedure has not been restricted to top level elections, for political 
communicat ions specialists '' are currently performing tasks for politicians 
at all levels of gover-illnent . 115 This is definitely the case in New York, 
and this observation also holds true in the states of ~vashington, Oregon, 
Illinois, I•'iichigan, Ohio, Petmsylvania, and Massachusetts. 6 
A. final point to be noted is that a party's expenditures for 
11 commercial corrununications services" are not increas ed if it employs an 
1Based upon a compilation of Foster Furcol o 1 s television schedule, 
station time-rates, and television production costs in the 1958 
Has sachusetts Democratic gubernatorial caJnpaign. Infra, chap . iii, 
pp . 60- 64 . 
2TT . 0 K J . . 50L v • ey, r . , op . Cl"L., p. ~ · 
3The Nev.r York Times, October 27 , 1958, p. 15 . 
4stanley Kelley, Jr. , ou . cit . , p . 37 . 
5Ibid . , p . 36 . 
6Ibid. 
3 
1 
advertising agency. The media rates are the same, regardless of whether 
a party places its advertisements or plans its prograr'lS directly •2 
Because of the rise and need of the political communications 
specialist, it is of vital concern to determine ~mat this new force means 
to our political environment . 
The Decline of the Boss 
One of the most basic aspects of political life affected by the 
gro,nh of the mass media of communications has been the change in 
relationship of the traditional role of the party organization to the 
campaign itself . This is not to say that the party organization and the 
machine have no role to play today, but rather that 11 the capacity of the 
candidate to appeal directly to the voters by r adio and TV has reduced or 
at l east cha.nged the signif icance of local party organizations . 11 3 
The po>'ler of the boss depended in part on his monopoly, for 
political purposes , of ties >·Jith the electorate . He had a kind of 
independence, because, at any given moment , the relationships he had 
built \·lith his bloc of votes could not be duplicated . 'i'he 111B.ss medi a 
of communication offer a channel through which leader s can appeal 
directly to the voter and over the head of the boss . His monopoly 
of power is broken . 4 
'rhe final question now becomes 1"1-hether the advantages gained by 
destroying one pm.-rer structure , out1'leigh the inherent evils of the ne~v 
system. 
1charles Thomson, op . cit . , p . 158 . 
~lartin Mayer, Nadison Avenue, U.S. A. (Nel-l York : Harper & 
Brothers , 1958), p . 298 . 
3 V. 0. Key, Jr . , op . cit ., p . 505 . 
4stanley Kelley , Jr . , op . cit • , p . 209 • 
4 
Carey l1cVJilliams , w·ri ting in the Nation , feels that 11 expert 
political management has its dangers, but in the long run they are 
probably not so g reat as those of the old dispensation . 111 But Hartin 
~!J:ayer believes that if "expert political management" in its most extreme 
5 
form r esults i n the elevations of the McCarthy 's, and that bossism 11 results 
in Hagues, Pews and Prendergasts [that] most intellig ent people will opt 
eagerly for Prendergast . 11 2 
The Decision- Haki ng Process 
~1uch concern has been expressed over who controls the campaign . 
Does the decision- wBking process lie within the hands of the advertising 
agency and public relations firm, or in the hands of the candidate? 
1'he cause of this concern rests upon two basic as sumpt ions . First , 
that the politician, as a potential public off icial , must shape his 
relationship tm:lards his constituents vdth some regard to the facts . 
He has to deal ltdth the interest of his public which is r eal and independent 
of his manipulation. He has to f it his actions to a reality that exists . 
Secondly, that the political communications specialist is not affected by 
these pressures .3 A practitioner who calls for complete control of a 
1
carey Ndhllial11'3, "Government by \lihi taker & Baxter, 11 Nation , 
Hay 5, 1951, pp . 420-21 . 
~{art in Na.yer, op . cit, • , p . 30 5. 
~'Jilliam Lee Hiller , op . cit., p . 12 . 
campaign is under tremendous pressure to v-lin . 1 He is highly susceptible 
to substitute "illusions of [his] oV>m devising; f or existing facts • 11 2 He 
is a ccused of acting as a charlatan and practicing 11 hucksterism. 11 3 
The most illustrious example of this is the case of Jon Jonkel, 
public relations counsel from Chicago . In 1950, Senator Millar d Tydings 
of Iviaryland , 1.vas opposed for re-election by John l"iarshall Butler . It 1··ras 
during this period that HcCarthyism, v-lith its strong anti-Comrr.unist 
overtones , ·was running high . This \·Ta.ve of NcCarthyism caused people to 
wonder \vhether various government officials were being too soft on 
Com;·nunists i n this countl"J . Tydings 1-..ras receiving nation-wide publicity 
for the Senate 1 s i nvestigation into alleged Communist influence i n the 
6 
State Department, and thus he v~as highly prone to such speculation . 
HeamJhile , the Butler group had hired Jonkel f or :;;a ,250 a month . It was 
Jonkel 1s idea to capitalize on this f eeling of 11 doubt 11 that existed not 
only in the minds of the peopl e of Haryl and, but thr oughout the nation .4 
This campaign reached it s climax when Jonkel doctored a photograph so that 
it appeared as i f Senator Tydings \'las attentively engaged in an impor tant 
conversation 1rith Earl Browder . 5 It was Jonkel 1-Jho v1as responsible for the 
1
stanl ey Kelley, Jr., O£• cit . , p . 45 . 
2~·Jilliam Lee Hiller, op . cit ., p . 13 . 
3The Nevr York Times, July 30, 1958, p . 41. 
4stan~ey Kelley , Jr . , op . cit ., p . 121 . 
51-Tart in l:'Iayer , op . cit . , pp . 303-04 . 
l direction of the entire campe.ign rather than candidate Butler . 
But all recent reports indicate that this case is the exception . 
Some outsiders have had the feeling that Hadison Avenue is =tbout 
to ta<e over the poli cy-:rnak:Lng function . As a bloodied veteran of 
many campaigns, l et me assure you that the opposite is true . In a 
good ma.11y cases the extent of our influence is to convince the 
candidate by the end of the campaign to read his speeches from a 
teleprompter, instead of from notes in his ha.nd . 2 
Robert Hmnphreys, publicity director o:f the Republican Party is emphatic : 
11 The ae:;ency performs a technical function that no political party could do . 
,., 
But the~r v-rould be babes in the vmods if they tried to set our policy . ".J 
The Democratic Publicity Handbook states that_, 11 publicity and advertising 
experts can do the technical job of publicizing your progr am. But you are 
the one vTho should set the tone of your camp=tign and rr.ake the political 
decisions . 114 The general thought prevaiJing among politic::tl leaders 
concerning the proper role of agencies , ~~ites Carl Spielvogel, staff 
1vriter of The Nev.r York Times, is trn.t 11 an ad executive 1·muld first have 
to be =t precinct captain -- as Hell as an expert on time-bu.ying and the 
creative a.d skills -- before a campaign l eader v.rould consider him ripe for 
political policy-making . 11 5 Perhaps a more a.ccurate smrunation of the 
l r u.s. Senate, Mar;1h.nd Senatorial Election of 1950, Hear:i_n..gs before 
the Subconunittee on Privileges a.11.d Elections of the Committee on Rules and 
Adr'linistration, Pursuant to s . Res . 250, 82d Gong ., lst Sess ., 1950 
(itJashington, D. C.: United States Govermnent Printing Office, 1950) , p . 8 • 
. 2Lloyd Hhi tebrook _, Executive Vice- President , Ka.stor , Hilton, 
Chesley & Clifford , Inc., as quoted in The Ne~ York Times, October 27 , 1958 , 
p. 15 . 
3The Ne1-1 York Times, October 27, 1958, p . 15 . 
5Ibict . 
situation would be that of Charles Thomson ' s: 
The role of advertising agencies in devising campaign themes and 
strategy is hard to estimate. Many som~ces of ideas and strategy 
surround each candidate; the particular contribution of any institution 
cannot be generalized . But the contribution of the agencies is present, 
and of considerable practical and potential effect on the conduct of 
politics . l 
The Question of Ethics 
There are four possible campaign situations . 
1. The ethical candidate and his ethical political corrnnunications 
specialist . 
2. The unethical candidate and his unethical political 
cowmunications specialist. 
3. The ethical candidate and his unethical political 
connnunications specialist .• 
4. The unethical candidate and his ethical political 
communications specialist . 
In theory, situations three and four wotlld occur only occasionally, for in 
the norw~l course of affairs~ an ethical candidate is not going to hire an 
unethical agency, nor is the ethical agency going to \'Tork for an unethical 
candidate . However, there are t:i.Jnes \'hen an unethical agency might be 
' II foisted" upon an ethical but politically naive candidate -- and vice versa . 
vfuatever the case, this mathematical derivation serves the purpose of 
illustrating the exist:ing problem of the questi on of ethics that is 
involved in politics . 
lcharles Thomson, op . cit . , p . 157 . 
Thus a black and N'lite situation r eulains , and the question becomes 
1:vhether the politic i an will be 11 sincere and gift ed ••• and by the 
i ns trument of propaganda ••• mold and f orm the 1vill of the peopl e, 111 or 
will the politician be 11 i nsincere 11 and provide himself v.Jith talented 
people 11 'vmo understand the manipulation of opinion . tn 2 
The Problem of Oversimulification 
The preparation of a ctual broad cast annou..ncements is one of the 
basic duties performed by an agency for a political campai gn) These 
11 forms of statement tend to be shaped by the beliefs about cornrnunications 
e..nd strategies common to connnercia.l rna.rketing • 11 4 11 The theme ••• should 
have simplicity and clarity . iviost of a ll, it must high-point the ma j or 
issues of t he campai gn wit h great brevity - - in languag e that paints a 
picture understandable t o people in all cir cumstanc es . 11 5 Also i ndicative 
of the fo rm an announcement. lrd.ll take : 
A broad theme must be developed, based on t he issues and personalit i es 
involved . 
It may be a positive theme stressing the accompli shments of your 
candidate or a negative one attacki n..g the record of the opponent . 
After the theme is developed, it should be gondensed into simple 
form that can be used as a campai gn slogan . 
1 
Edivard 1 . Bernays, Propaganda ( Nev.r York : H. Liveright Co ., 1929 ), 
p . 92 . 2. 
ltJilbur Schrarn:n, Responsibilitz in Jvlass Communi cat ions (Nevr York: 
Harper & Brothers, 1957 ), p . 161 
3Hartin He..yer , op . cit ., p . 300 . 
4charles Thoms on, op . cit ., p . 157 . 
5Leone Baxter as quoted in Stanley Kelley , Jr ., .£1?..• cit ., p . 49 . 
6Horton Lav.rrence, 11 Politica l campai gns, 11 Printer' s InJ{, 
September 14, 1956 , p . 44 . 
9 
This procedure might be effective , but rn.any would agree with 
Hayer's examination of the ethical implications involved. 11 Democra cy does 
not benefit -~'rnen [the voters~ political apathy is disturbed by emotional 
slogans presenting simplified and one-sided vie1,Is of the complicated 
l 
affairs of state . 11 11 El ections v.rhich are seriously influenced by . . . 
[this appr·oach ] depart a great distance from the democratic ideal of an 
informed and responsible electorate making i ntelligent and sober 
decisions . 112 But the agency argues against this criticism by maintaining 
that 
10 
'I'he electorate is uninformed and irresponsible before advertising 
enters . Poli ticiaJJ.S in their speeches , and partisans v.rriting about the 
ca~paign in the press, do not attempt to present the issues of an 
election in their full complexity . Like the advertising ma.n., they go 
searching for pat phrases , for slogans . 3 
It is difficult to argue against this defense , for 11 it is precisely 
on this level that politicians do their campai gning , ~nr.i. th or without the 
advice of Hadison Avenue •••• ' This was a technique that Roosevelt 
certainly employed, and vlas certainl y successful . • 11 Hm,rever , 11 even vihen 
one concedes the l egitimacy of the honest employment of advertising 
techniques in a. political campaign • • • the prospe ct provokes a queasy 
5 
stomach. 11 As long as the public is satisfied vdth "'ratered down versions 
of existent issues, more and more use 1rill be made of 11 sens atiom1lism to 
attract reluctant attention . u6 
1J.viartin Nayer, op. cit ., p . 305 . 
2Ibid., pp . 301-02 . 
4rbid ., p . 304 . 
3Ibid., p . 302 . 
5rbid ., p . 305 . 
6 Jon Jonkel as quoted in Stanley Kelley, Jr ., op . cit ., p . 232 . 
Thus the final effect is a reinforcement of the problem of over-
simplification that has constantly hampered the working gears of a true 
democracy . 
The P01ver of Television 
'I'elevision , more than any other media, is primarily responsible 
f ff t . th h th ~ h d . 1" t. 1 . . 1 ore ·ec 2ng e c anges a·u . ave occurre ln pol 2ca campalgl1lng . 
Because of the availability of television as a means of expression for use 
by the candidate to the voter, the power of the boss was greatly reduced, 
the employment of agencies was required, the question of ethics became 
all important, and the problem of oversimplification 1vas reinforced. 
But v·lhat of the direct effect of television upon voting behavior? 
Perhaps the most optimistic opinion concerning the use of television 1-.ras 
sounded by Rosser Reeves, the advertising executive in charge of President 
Eisenhov.rer 's spot television campaign, who stated that if Thomas Dewey had 
knovm and utilized the techniques practiced by Eisenhower in his campaign, 
he vmuld have been elected president. 2 However, this frame of reference 
is contrary to numerous studies. Television does not have the persuasive 
effect claimed for i t by some of its more zealous advo cates . The effect 
of television upon voting behavior must be evaluated in light of the 
candidate and his personality, the issues involved, and the \vorld, 
national, and regional situation . 
A study conducted by Joseph Siebert of Niami University 
concluded that Eisenhm,rer won because of certain personal characteristics, 
lcharles Thomson, op. cit . , p. 15. 
2l'.Yartin Nayer, op . cit . , p. 293 . 
11 
12 
his stand on foreign policy, and a feeling that there was a need for eha.nge 
in a.dministration . 1 Advantageous use of the medium >rill only result if 
there is a 11 candidate11 and effective issues . Televi sion 11 cannot create 
the candidate . At its best, it can show him clearly for 1'1i1at he is.'' 2 
Noreover, the effect of television upon voting behavior must be 
examined in light of predispositions and attitudes possessed by the 
voter. 
The People ' s Choice study emphasized that "political communica.tions 
served the important purpose of preserving prior decisions instead of 
initiating ne1tr decisions . It had the effect of reinforcing the 
original vote decision .') Televisi on, as an instrument of mass 
cmmnunication 111orks 11 in combination with the audience t s individual 
J 
predispositions and group norms . 11 '-~- Television 11 can canalize existing 
attitudes" but it is not so pov<erful as s ome would believe. 5 
The advent of television has far from negated the traditional 
forms of campaigning . 
lJoseph Siebert , The Influence of Television on the Election of 
1952, as cited i n Leo Bogart , The Age of 'relevision (Ne-,'l York: Frederick 
Unger Publi shing Co ., 1956), p . 228 . 
2Lloyd vJhitebrook as quoted in The New York Times, September 8, 1958 
p . 40 . 
3Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, Hazel Gaudet, The People ' s 
Choice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948), p. 87 . 
4Hilbur Schrarr.m, op. cit., p . 57 . 
5Ibid., p . 53. 
13 
Hi l liam Benton, who has been a United States senator ••• believes that 
the political values of a dvertising are highly overrat ed . He does 
not pitch in \vith the Democratic part y advert.ising effort at campai gn 
times because 11 1 1m too bysy carnpai gning 11 -- v:hich he r egards as a fa r 
more impor tant a ct ivity . - . 
In an effort to suppl ement the existing material on tel evision ' s 
relationship to the polit ica l process on a national l evel, the \'Iri ter has 
provided information drawn frnm his case study of a state gubernatorial 
el ection . 
:Hethodology 
Information for t his study 1·.ras obt a ined from per s onal intervievJs, 
part icipation and obs ervat ion, and library research. As this material 
a ccumul ated, it was classified under three categories. 
Speci f ically , the writer has attempted to study, seek out, eYcam:Lne, 
and set down for t he record, the actual r ole television played f or the 
Democratic guber natorial campai e;n of 1958 i n the Commomrealth of 
}fa ssachusetts , f rom a factual , production, and strategic standpoint . 
He utilized t he factual approach by compiling an actual listing , 
record , and tabulation of such asp ects of the campai gn as air time , 
nevrspaper promotion costs , ·and television production costs. Also i.ncluded 
>vas a compilation 0f the total coverage area and total broadcast t ime 
encompassing the use of television. 
He followed the production approach in terms of assessing 
objectively just to vJhat degree of s kill television v.ras used in this 
1
rv1artin Hayer , op. cit ., pp . 305-06. 
14 
campaign. Lastly, he employed the strategic approach in that he dealt with 
an examination of the philosophy employed, and the reasoning behind various 
cours es Which determined the direction of the entire television campaign. 
In regard to obtaining materi al concerning factual, production, 
and strategic matters, the approach was two-fold. 
The writer participated in the campaign itself, working for the 
Research Section of the Public Relations Division . He was able to maintain 
a critical perspective of what was taking place, because his main purpose 
within the Public Relations Division was to observe . People involved in 
the campaign spoke to him freely and vdthout reservation, for they knew 
that he had been granted permission by executive personnel to occupy this 
status of working and observing. 
He employed the open-end intervie·w quite frequently during the 
campaign and after it was over. Many members of the campaign staff 
cooperated with him in regard to this procedure, including: Elwood McKenney, 
chief coordinator of the Public Relations Division; Harold Turin, 
Advertising Accou_nt Executive involved in the campaign; Al Benjamin, 
Producer in charge of radio; Joan Smith, research and campaign speech 
writer; John Mallan, research and campaign speech writer; Paul McGerigle, 
head of the Research Section; Tony Lukas, writer of the Kay Furcolo 
television shows; and Coleman Bornstein, President of the Young Democrats 
of Massa cl1 usetts. 
The writer had t he opportunity t o view the entire television 
campaign. He employed his own production checklist system to provide 
further insight into the questions concerning television production. In 
addition, a record of the genera l content of each campaign broadcast was 
1 
kept. 1'his material helped a.11swer the general question as to vlhy certain 
subject matter was used for such and such a date of broadcast . 
Library research material v.ras also employed to obtain background 
15 
and scholarly information in the subject . Especially useable vlere the 
studies ()f Charles Thomson, 2 Hartin Nayer,3 Stanley Kelley, Jr . ,4 V. o. 
Key, Jr . , 5 Joseph Siebert, 6 Paul Lazarsfeld, 7 and \rJi lbur Schramm. 8 Various 
fictional case studies in politics such as Edidn 0 1 C()nnor' s The Last 
Hurrah, 9 were often quite helpful, as 1-vere specific articles in publications 
such as Broadcasting, Sponsor, and Tide; in general magazines such as 
Harper's, The Reporter, and Satur_day Review, and in such newspapers as The 
New York Times, The Boston Globe, The Christian Science Honitor, The 
lsee J.ppendix A for a Sample Television Production and Content 
_Analysis Sheet . 
2Te1evision and Presidential Politics (Hashington, D. C. : Brookings 
Institution, 1956). 
3J.Vladis()n Avenue, U.S.A . (Ne-,.r York: Harper & Brothers, 1958) . 
4Professional Public Relations and Political Power ( Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1956) . 
r.: )Politics Parties, and Pressure Groups (Ne11 York: Thomas Y. 
CrovTell Co . , 1958). 
6The Influence of Television on the Election of 1952, as cited in 
Leo Bogart , The Ag e of Television (NeN York: Frederick Unger Publishing Co. , 
1956) ' p . 228 . 
?The People's Choice (New York: Columbia UP..i versity Press, 1948) . 
E1tesponsibility in Hass Communications (New York: Harper & 
Brothers, 1957) . 
9The L.ast Hurrah (Boston: Little, Brm•m a.nd Company, 1956) .. 
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Boston Herald, and The Boston Traveler. Information received from these 
sources provided thoughtful comparisons and provoked certain questions that 
the writer knew he must find the answers to in this campaign. 
Many factors which seemingly were responsible for the vote produced 
for Furcolo, including the impact of television, have been explored in this 
thesis . Hm•tever, to ha,re isolated the factors that would have led to 
measuring television's direct effect upon the vote, was beyond the scope of 
II this study. 
In Chapter I the writer explores the campaign organization which 
II 
determined the role television played in the campaign . 
deals with an examination of the problems faced in determining the strategy 
In Chapter II he 
1 to be employed during the campaign. In Chapter III he makes a thorough 
I 
I study of the medium of television . Set forth is the scope of television 
I 
II 
saturation, the philosophy behind the use of a filmed or live television 
program, the political environment in which television lived, and the 
process involved in the production of these programs. In Chapter IV, the 
-writer analyzes the factors involved in the success of the teleVision 
campaign and the entire campaign. In Chapter V he stmmarizes the major 
points established in this study . 
----u-----------------------........... ... 
Remember tha.t there are parts of what it most 
concerns you to kno\oi which I cannot describe 
to you; you must come 1d th me and see for 
yourselves . The vision is for him who will 
see it. 
Plotinus 
The Enneads 
= 
CHAPTER I 
ORGANIZATION 
The role of television in the Furcolo gubernatoria l campaign of 
1958 VJ"as determined by the Steering Committee and the Public Relations 
Division, the t vm most important sections of the headquarters organization . 
However, the headquarters organization consisted of more than just these 
two sections, as is illustrated by Figure 1. The role of these other 
divisions of t he headquarters organization in relation t o the television 
campaign, will be explored, wherever appropriate, throughout the thesis . 
In theory , it \'las fairly simple to distinguish at 1'1"hich point the 
responsibilities and a ccomplishments of one corrnnittee left off , and those 
of another began . In reality, though , this distinction was not quite so 
clear . A certain amount of interplay beb.veen committees \'Tas inherent . 
Certain individuals represented on the Steering Connnittee , for example, 
were either direct representatives of the Public Rel ations Division or 
workin_ members of the Public Relations Division . Hence, the reader should 
keep in mind that the follmring organizational breakdm.m into specific 
categories vl"as for means of clarification, and should not assume that there 
1.Yas no overlapping of responsibility and accompli shment . It would be 
closer to the truth to assume that within the organization multil a teral 
responsibility existed for certain men . A study of Figure 2 ".v:ill aid the 
reader in understanding this . 
Figure 1 - GENER.A.L ORGANIZATIONAL CHARTa 
I The I lr- ----- - --1 Steering Gomr:nittee 1- --------,  
I Public Relations I Division 
I Ethnic / Comnittees . -
1 Portugu•r' rtaLan , \ 
I Jewish I I French I I Polish I 
j Irish I 
I Campaign Chairman 
Campaign 
Directors 
I Youth j j City Managers j I Tov..n Hanagers I 
I County II Advanced II Speaker 1 s I Committee Agents Bureau Legal I 
~:~n 1 s I Transportation ~ I Education 
1 Comrn:J..utee Cmmnittee j___j Committee 
asource: Inter-Office Vertical Listing - Furcolo for Governor Committee Headquarters, October 6, 1958 
II 
Public Relations 
Advisory Committee 1-
Research 
Section 1----+---1 
I Press I 1 Section r------
Figure 2 - PUBLIC RELATIO:f\TS DIVISIONa 
The Steering 
~----~ Committee r--------------------------1 
Public Relations 
Director 
Headquarters 
Organization 
Chief 
Coordinator!----------------~~--------------------
Public Relations I I Advertising I I Film I 
Section ~ Agency ~- --------~Company 
aSource: Inter-Office Vertical Listing - Furcolo for Governor Committee Headquarters, October 6, 1958 
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The Steering Committee 
The individuals comprising this coi!JIYl.ittee were responsible for 
steering, directing, controlling , and acting as the primary committee of the 
entire campaign organization . The members were : 
Governor Foster Furcolo -- a mBn in his late forties, graduate of 
Yale Law School, former congressman and state treasurer, and once defeated 
candidate for the U~ited States Senate, serving his first term as governor, 
and seeking a second term. Mr ~ Furcolo is , at present, Governor of the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, successful in his bid for a second term. 
Charles Mahoney -- a man in his late tv;enties, graduate of Boston 
University School of Public Relations and Conununications, and Boston 
University Law School. At the time of the campaign, }fr . Mahoney was chief 
executive assistant to tre Governor . Mr . Mahoney ' s association '<lith the 
Governor dated back to Furcolo 1s politically active days in Springfield . 
At present writing, Iv1r ~ Mahoney is Conunissioner of Administr a.tion . 
KerntL t Morrissey - a man in his late thirties, former professor 
of government at Amherst College, and now studying at Ha.rvard University. 
Ivfr. Morrissey attended Boston University during the same years as Charles 
Mahoney, and was asked to join the Governor ' s staff by Mahoney . At the 
time of the campaign, Mr . Morrissey was B. member of the executive staff of 
the Governor. At present writL~g, he is Di rector of the State Budget . 
Elw·ood IvlcKenney -- a practicing lawyer~ in his early forties , 
;.ms a volunteer -worker in the 19 56 gubernatorial campaign, after which he 
was asked to join the executive staff of the Governor . At the time of the 
19 58 campaign, Hr . HcKenney "ras Executive Secretary to the Governor 1 s 
Council, a position which he still holds . 
J. John Fox-- chief secretary to the late Governor Paul Dever. 
A man in his late forties, ~~. Fox was, during the campaign, and is at 
present, Judge of the Municipal Court of the City of Boston. 
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The television campaign responsibilities of these five men, will be 
dealt with s h:> rtly, under their respective commit tees .. The follmdng five 
men were primarily concerned with campaign responsibilities other than those 
pertaining directly to the television campaign . 
Thomas 0 'Neill -- a man in his early fifties . At the time of the 
campaign, Mr. O'Neill represented a Greater Bost on congressional district. 
At present writing, he is serving the remainder of his term. Nr. O'Neill 
was chosen to be Campaign Chairman . 
James Landers -- a man in his early forties . Mr. Landers ' 
association with the Governor dated back to his politically active days in 
Springfield. At the time of the campaign, Mr. Landers was a practicing 
attorney. He presently practices the same profession. Mr . Landers was 
chosen to be a Campaign Director . 
Theodore Glynn -- a ma.n in his early forties . At one time, 
l.fr. Glynn had served as a state representative from the Greater Boston 
area. At the time of the campaign, Mr. Glynn "'ras a practicing attorney. 
At present, he is, Judge of the 1-'Iunicipal Court of the City of Boston. 
Mr. Glynn was chosen to be a Campaign Director. 
Anthony DiNatale -- a man in his early fifties . At the time of 
t he campaign, }~ . DiNatale was Commissioner of the Department of Public 
Works. He presently holds the same office . Mr. DiNatale >'las concerned, 
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primarily, "With financing this campaign. 
Bernard Solomon -- a man in his late thirties . At the time of the 
campaign, JvT..r . Solomon was State Purchasing Agent. He presently holds the 
same office. Mr. Solomon has been a travelling companion of the Governor's 
since his 1954 campaign for United States Senator.l 
Of spec:ial importance was the fact that the entire Steering 
Comrr~ttee, as it existed on paper, was not as strongly involved as the 
Governor, Charles Mahoney, a.nd. Elwood McKenney.. As the campaign progressed, 
these people assumed the majority of the responsibility of the Steering 
Connnittee. Even then, in th:l last analysis, the Governor made the 
d . . 2 ec~s~ons. He was a highly individualistic candidate, unpredictable at 
times, and he overrode his colleagues if he thought his approach was more 
sound.3 
The Steering Committee might be compared to the comptroller of a 
corporation, :ln that they were responsible for the control and allocation 
of funds to various conunittees. An analogy also might have been made 
between the Steering Connnittee arrl the board of directors of a corporation, 
in that they were both decision-making bodies concerned with top policy 
1 Background information on these men based upon an interview with 
Coleman Bornstein, Boston, March 10, 1959. 
2Interviewwith Harold Turin, Boston, March 11, 1959 . 
3rnterview with Paul McGerigle, Boston, October 6, 1958. 
In direct contrast to this, Robert Murphy ' s 1954 Democratic bid 
for the Governor's office was characterized by his inability to effectively 
control the campaign . Murphy 1>Tould constantly tell his lieutenants to do 
what they thought was best . See Kevin O'Connell, "The Party and the 
People" (unpublished Bachelor ' s Thesis, Harvard University, 1955), p . 16. 
2L~ 
conside1·ations . General strategy for all phases of the campaign vlas ph.nned 
and discussed by this corrrrni.ttee . Top strategy meetings vlere held every 
night, if the Governo:(' 1 s schedule alloHed, at the Sheraton-Plaza Hotel in 
Copley Square . The hotel v.ras just tvro blocks away froJTI the Furcolo for 
Governor Committee Headquarters on Boylston Street , t he wo r king plant of 
the organization . 
The major portion of the third floor of this Boylston Street 
building 1·ras devoted to the Public Relations Division.1 The i.rnplementation 
and refinement of certain points came under the jurisdi ction of respective 
committees . The Governor rrd.ght have decided that he wanted to print a 
leaflet emphasizi.Dg the ultra-conservative record of his Republican 
opponent, Charles Gibbons . The respect.i v e members of various cornmi ttees 
would be informed of such a decisi on . The Research Section would gather 
the informCl.tion desired , the Public Relations Section ',ITould be responsible 
for the production and format of the leaflet, and the campaign headquarters 
organization would handle the distribution/ I n this instance, the 
organizational structure of this campaign was in complete contrast to the 
Democratic gubernatorial campaign of 1954 ~ In 1954, the central board 
failed to provide direction to the campaign organi z-.ation _ The strategy nd 
issues department was in a 11 drifting and chaotic state . 11 3 
Of primary c:oncern to this study 1tras the relationship of t he 
1rnterv:Le\l' with E.lwood McKenney, Boston, Januar~r 19, 19 59 . 
2Interview with Harold Turin, Boston, December 29, 1958. 
3Kevin 0 ' Connell, 11 The Party an::l. the People11 (unpublished Bachelor 1 s 
Thesis , Harvard University, 1955), p . 17 . 
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Steering Committee to the Public Relations Division, because the role of 
-.elevision vms determined by the preparation and a ction of these tvlO 
committees. 
The Public Relations Division 
Charl e s Hahoney was chosen as t he m.-:m to have pri mar y res ponsibilit y 
for the public relations program of the campaign. Administrative respon-
sibility was delegated to Elwood NcKenney . He acted a s the chief 
coordinator of the Public Relations Division, being responsible for the 
pl anning , preparation and execution of all projects, a ssignments, and 
f .1.. "" t h• d . . . 1 UnCu10ns 0~ _1S 1V1S1011 e 
Elltlood McKen.ney was requested 
Kay Furcolo television sho,.rs. 2 
In addition to his vdde executive duties, 
by the Governor to produce the Coffee vrith 
Within t he Public Relations Divisirm itself, existed an adv'"i.eory 
co~ittee, entitled, the Public Relations Committee. This committee was 
composed, primarily, of two leading members of the Steering ComLuttee, 
3 Kermit Morrissey, and J. John Fox, and the account executive from the 
advertising agency in charge of media during the campaign, Harold Turin. 
1 
~1emo distributed to executive personnel involved in the campaign, 
October 6, 1958 . 
2rnterviev.r with Elwood !>1cKenney, Boston, January 19, 1959. 
3Judge Fox was considered to be politically brilliant in terms of 
his knowledge concerning various factions which existed within the 
Democratic party in the state. This knowledge was of extreme importance 
because the Governor had t o determine with 'Whom he would appear on 
television, and at the same time be cognizant of -,~hom he might be offending 
if he made a certain choice . Interview with Harold Turin, Boston, ' 
!>1arch 11, 19 59 . 
= 
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The overall function of this committee was to plan and develop the methods, 
techniques, and ideas to be used within the execution of all public 
relations projects.1 
The complete legislative background of the Governor and his 
opponent was compiled qy the Research Section of the Public Relations 
Division. The people oomprising this section were also bro~ht together due 
to the efforts of Charles Mahoney. Paul McGerigle, the head of the section 
met Charles Mahoney at Boston University. At the time of the campaign, 
McGerigle was head of the executive research staff at the State House . At 
the present time, 1~. McGerigle holds the same position. John Mallan, 
I ll campaign speech writer, was a professor of govero..ment at Boston University 
under whom Charles 1-fahoney studied. At the time of the campaign, V1r . l1a.llan 
was Executive Secretary of the Commission on the Audit of State Needs. 
v~. Mallan, presently, holds the same position . 2 Joan Smith, campaign 
speech \'lriter, \vho was a. student of John Mallan 1s while he was teaching at 
Smith College, was brought into the organization by 1-iallan . At the time of 
the campaign, 1-Iiss Smith was a member of the executive research staff, a 
position which she still holds . 
All research material used or requested by the Public Relations 
Division was provided by the Research Section) This group utilized the 
records of the Massachusetts Legislature . A newspaper clipping file was 
~emo distributed to executive personnel involved in the campaign, 
October 6, 1958 . 
2Interview with John Mallan, Boston, March ll, 1959 . 
3Memo distributed to executive personnel involved in the campaign, 
October 6, 1958. 
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maintained . Articles vlhl. ch in any -vmy might be considered as relating to 
the campai gn , -vmre clipped and cat egorized a ccording to subject . The 
broadcasting activity of the Governor and his opponent was monitored and 
recorded . Beca1..1.Se of the t1rm latter actions of the Res earch Sect j_on, a 
daily surrunation of what the press was printing , and of ivhat vras being s ai d 
in radio and television broadcasts could be distributed to executive 
personnel, and aid the:rn in their execution of the ce.J!l.paign . 
The Press Section , headed by 1rJilliam Gorski, former newspaperman for 
The Bo ston Globe, was responsible for the issuance ol' all news r eleases from 
the Public Relations Division to daily and vieekly nei·lspapers •1 
The Public Relations Section was responsible f or nevmpaper and 
ne>-vslett er production, television and radio product1on, f or the pr eparation 
of a ll 1·1ritten materi al, i ncluding television and radio scripts , fact-
sheets , brochures , pamphl ets, inforrr.ation sheets , and campaign litera.ture 
f l . d d d . t• 2 o every _nn an es crlp lon . In terms of vmrk output on a day to day 
basis , and i n regard to the daily encountering of pr actical problems, this 
section >vas more heavily burdened than any other vrorking unit of the 
campaign organization . Individ1.1.al s comprising this section Nere primaril y 
dra>m f rom all other committees or sections as Has expedient anci neces sar y . 
1;Jithin this secti on o f the organization, all the diverse components of the 
television ca!ilpai gn gained some s embl ance of order . Here v·iithin this 
l Herno distributed to executive personnel involved in the campai gn, 
Oct ober 6, 1958 . 
2Hemo di stributed t o executive personnel i nvolved in the campaign, 
October 6, 1958 . 
= 
vmrking unit, preparation and research became a reality; the plans of the 
Steering Committee, the advice of the Public Relations Committee, the 
material furnished by the Research Section, the work o f the advertising 
agency and film company -- this v<as all d:rm-m together for presentation . 
The Advertis i ng Agency 
The Herbert Frank Advertising Agency of Boston and Ne1·r York, vfas 
employed by the Governor to handle the t echnical problems involved in 
dealing vJith media ( time-buying , nev-Ispaper advertising, televis i on 
production) . Harold Turin was the account executive in charge of the 
campaign . In actuality, his contribution to the campai gn vJ"ent far beyond 
the tech:..r1ica l stage -- as a member of the Public Relations Conunit tee, a 
><Triter of song and slogan, and, along 1"lith Elwood HcKenney , a s producer of 
all live television shovfs. 
Harold Turin received his 11aster 1 s degree from Boston University 
School of Public Relations and Com..rnunic ations in Journalism. In 1954 he 
>vorked for the Governor during the Senatorial campaign . Bet v.Jeen the years 
of 195L~ and 1956, Hr. Turin chang ed agencies and vlent to vJOrk for the 
Herbert Frank Advertising Agency . In 1956, during Furcolo 1 s f i r st bid fnr 
the Governor 1 s office, VJ.r . Turin again vms in charge of the technical 
problems involved in dealing with the Inedia . He \"las also responsible for 
the hiring of Tony Lukas , former editor of the Harvard Crimson, wno was 
employed, primarily, as a script writer for the Kay Furcolo television 
1 programs. 
1rnterview lHith Harold Turin, Boston, J.VIarch 11, 1959, 
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The Film Company 
The shooting of film, narration, editing, and kinescope recording, 
all took place at the studios of Trans-Radio Productions Inc . under the 
supervision of Pm.u Niner . l•Ir . Hiner \•ras recommended to the Governor by 
Helen Stevenson Meyner, the >vlfe of Governor Heyner of New Jersey, as being 
a competent political film specialist. Previously, he had ·Harked for 
Governor Harriman and for various labor groups in Nevv- York state . l 
Also at his disposal vms thousands of feet of stock film 1.-.rhich had 
been shot over the past two years by Ivlagna Film Productions Inc . , plus 
several television shm'-fs in i•,rhich the Governor appeared that had been 
filmed in 1rJashington, D. C., at Congressional Studios Inc . 2 1-'lr . Hiner ''ras 
the voice of the campaign, announcing filn1ed and live television shows, 
except for the Coffee with Kay Furcolo series . 
This, then, was the Governor ' s organization. This was a 
politically oriented organization . The people who assumed the roles of 
public opinion experts and policy strategists Here politically 
active individuals or professors of govermnent from neighboring 
Ufl.iversities . The role of the advertising agency and film company vms 
incorporated .,,rithin this huge propagandistic organization . Similarity 
existed between this organization and that of the organization behind 
Governor Stevenson 1 s 1952 presidential campaign . He too led his forces 
lintervielv vrith Harold Turin, Boston , Harch 11, 1959 . 
2Intervie1'r Nith Harold Turin, Boston, December 29 , 1958 . 
1 
along <'lith the aid of government and ne1..vspaper oriented people. 
Finally, a high degree of rapport existed among the Governor and 
his staff . The majority of them had vmrked toget her since 1954, at Hhich 
time the Governor ran for United States Senator agai nst the incumbent , 
Senator Saltonstall. The Governor's first state-wide campaign dated back 
to 1952 ~vhen he ran for the off ice of state treasurer . Six years , four of 
them in office, offered the Governor ample opportunity to build his 
organization . Couple this vvith the fact that Judge Fox V>ras able to enlist 
the support of "~<vhat was l eft of the Dever organizat ion, and the result vms 
a poV>rerful political force in operation . They were a close-knit group . 
They believed quite strongly in the political philos ophy developed during 
30 
the reign of Franklin Delano Roosevelt: that it was the role of government 
to t ake an overtly active interest in the security of the individual. 
Disagreement mi ght have arisen over the means to the end , but never over the 
2 
end itself . 
The necessity for developing a personal campaign staff l ay in the 
fact that at the present time , in Hassachusetts, a Democratic candidat e 
cannot depend upon the Democratic State Committee to provide him 1·Jith an 
organization . 
There in no sense exists v.rithin the Democratic Party a permanent 
machine , or even a nucleus thereof, ivhich can be inherited by 
successive candidates and f urnish them vnth an experi enced core of 
1 Stru1ley Kelley, Jr., op . cit ., pp . 158-59 . 
support on >'i'nich to build . Instead, each ambitious politician must 
strive to build up his personal organization, a process -v.rhich usually 
involves a slmv climb up the political l adder .1 
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Nor could the ca..Ddidate depend upon the so-called v-rard bosses who say they 
can deliver the vote . Charles Nahoney felt that any vote they promised to 
deliver would have gone to the Governor an;;-way. This \vas an ol~ganization 
v·lhich gained its strength from its headquarters people and not from its 
field forces . The field forces could not be relied upon . 11 You never 
really lmm·r •·rhat they are doing • 11 2 
Furthermore, the de-emphasis upon deep concern with the activ-ity 
of the field forces or the ,,rard leaders 1<Tas rel ated to the fact that the 
Governor believed very strongly that television and its appeal to large 
audiences was the most effective means of campaigning in this day and age . 
1-"·lhat were people doing v.rhen precinct >vorkers rang doorbells? They were 
h . t 1 . . 3 Hate lng e eVl.Slon . 
The Governor Is inner circle gre1il from a group of political amateurs 
to a group of political experts . There 1-rere problems that a rose 1Hithin the 
organization but they Here not due to dissent . The element of time was a 
major cause for breakdmm of operation .4 1-'lnother constant probl em v.Jas 
1Kevin 0 1Conne11, op . cit., pp . 35-36 . 
2Interview v.;ith John Ha1lan, Boston, De cember 15, 19 58 . 
,.., 
.JintervieVI v.rith John Hallan , Boston , December 15, 1958 . 
At one point during the campaign, a Furcolo telecast reached into 
21,785 television homes . During this quarter-hour, 49 . 2% of Boston 1 s 
790,700 television horne s had their sets in use . Furcolo 1 s share of the 
audience wafJ 5 . 6% or 21,785 television homes . The Boston television 
audience , .tunerican Research Bureau, Inc ., HNAC-TV, 8 : 00 P .1'I., Octoberl4,1958. 
4Intervim•r 1vith Elwood IvlcKenney, Boston, J anuary 19 , 1959. 
= 
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determining to what extent certain charges made by the opposition should be 
1 
answered . These factors will be explored further in other sections of the 
thesis . 
But the reader should not be led to believe that the proper 
1 organization could achieve any political ends it w.ished . In 1952, Paul 
Dever had as well- financed and well-geared ~~ operation as any politician 
could desire, but in this case the organization was not enough to counter 
the cllarges of corruption that led to his defeat . 
1rntervie'I'T with John Mallan, Boston, December 15, 19 58 . 
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CHAPTER II 
STRATEGIC PREPARATION 
The men responsible for the entire campaign philosophy oriented 
t heir thinking in terms of television presentation . The Steering 
Committee 1 s first order of business dealt v.rith finding the campaign plan 
most suitable to the situation in which the administration fotmd itself 
prior to campaign time, and one that 1vnuld be adaptable to television . 
Basically, there 'vere three reasons as to why television '"as to be 
the primary connecting link between any campaign plan and the public. First , 
television v-Ias held to be the perfect medium for the candidate r s 
personality. Furcolo v.ras no newcomer to television. He had used the medium 
successfully and extensively in the 1956 gubernatorial campaign against his 
Republican opponent, Sumner ~fuittier . An effective speaker, an accomplished 
debater, capable of handling the medium, Furcolo and television were a 
natural combination. 11 Television, 11 declared Harold Turin, 11 is the most 
effective means of reaching the people in terms of cost per thousand if your 
candidate can handle the medium.ul 
Secondly, television assured Furcolo of having the opportunity to 
1Interview with Harold Turin, Boston, January 5, 1959. 
This illustrates more clearly, Furcolo's strong desire to campaign 
primarily via television. It v<as not just the idea that television was a 
more effective vfeapon tha..11 dependence upon your field forces , but also the 
fact that Furcolo knelv he >vas capable of turning in a good performance over 
television. Supra, chap. i, p . 31. 
II 
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The Campaign Plan 
Various strategies were contemplated. Thought vacillated bet\-Teen a 
"negative" and a "positive" approach.1 
I During the legislative year of 1957, the first year of the 
Governor's two year term, comparatively few of the major bills proposed by 
the executive office were passed by the legislature . It was not unconmon 
to see newspaper headlines such as, 11 GOP MEASURE SUBSTITUTED IN STUNNING 
SETBACK J:i'OR FURCOIDL12 In fact the newspapers were practically branding the 
Governor as a complete failure. 111rlith a Democrat-dominated House and a 
Senate so close that its Republican presidency v-ras a coalition in which five 
Republicans were joined by 16 Democrats, Gov. Furcolo ' s program ran head on 
into a situation of ultra-conservatism within his own party that is without 
cotmterpart in Bay State annals . 113 In one instance, the legislative record 
of Governor Furcolo was published in the form of a box-score. 
Furcolo Proposed 
Sales tax 
HOW FUHCOLO PROPOSALS 
.FARED IN LEGISLATURE 
State bond issue for airport hangars 
Bond issue for major construction project 
Spending program 
Clarify sex offender law 
Study changes in Port Authority Act of 1956 
Legislature Disposed 
Killed 
Approved 
Approved 
Approved 
Approved 
Bill substituted 
and vetoed 
1Actually the campaign approach evolved gradually, even intui tively 
to a degree, rather than as a result of clear-cut rational decisions . 
2The Boston Herald, September 20, 1957, p . 1. 
3The Boston Globe, September 23, 1957, p . 4. 
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Additional $13 million for housing for the 
aged 
Memorialize Congress for Federal revolving 
loan fund for state assistance 
Forest fire relief 
Increase tax on cigarettes 
Increase tax on racing 
Make temporary taxes permanent 
Increase dependency allowance under income 
tax law 
Approved :)p 5, 000, 000 
Approved 
Approved 
Killed 
Killed 
Killed 
Killed 
~~75 million state aid to municipalities Killed 
Permit Boston to name mm police commissioner, Killed 
licensing board · 
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Call Constitutional Convention 
Expand scholarship program 
Killed 
Scholarship board 
Killed 
voted 
Add six Superior Court justices 
Referendum on capital punishment 
Atomic energy research center 
Forest camps for youths 
Commission on audit of state needs 
labor representative on Public Utility 
Commission 
Establish consumer's council 
Make terms of budget comm. etc., concurrent 
with governor 
Training agency for state employees 
State office building 
Establish bureau of state-federal relations 
Tax prosecution bureau 
Massach1setts transportation authority 
Killed 
Killed 
Killed 
Approved 
Killed 
Killed 
Killed 
Killed 
Pigeon-holed 
Killed 
Killed 
Killedl 
The year 1958 was little different because as campaign time 
approached, the major bills proposed by the administration still were 
pending action by the legislature. Due to these facts, the candidate and 
his colleagues felt that the advantages of being involved in any campaign 
plan that stressed accomplishment i'fere small indeed . 2 
B,y the middle of September, 1958, the legislature was still in 
session, and Furcolo am his strategists contemplated a campaign plan which 
1The Boston Globe, September 23, 1957, p. 4. 
2Interview with John Mallan, Boston, December 15, 1958. 
3? 
featured "negati vism11 [!.S its main theme . The po 1 i cy-ma.kers considered 
emphasizing such slogans as the lldo-nothing legislature," and rrpolitics or 
education . 11 The inner circle , being great admirers of Tru.rnan 1 s 191.:.8 
carn!,)aign, 1!rere greatly motive.ted to attempt this type of " ive 1 em hell" 
approach . Furcolo, like Harry TrUll18.n, was a ma:.-1. of extreme volatility, and 
vias considered capable of carrying off arw ty-pe of campaign approach if it 
1 
·,ras motivated and properly planned . 
Furthermore, on September 1?, 1958, The Boston Herald broke a story 
that seriously disturbed the candidate and his colleagues . "It '"as le~rned 
yesterday that one of Gov . Furcolo 1 s ca.mpaien managers , Guy A. Rossi 
o:f Dorchester, is recei v:l.ng ':p6?2 a v-reek for renting four chain sm·.rs to the 
DF•J •112 In the fo l lowinz da3rs the Her:::tlcl.-Tre.veler papers pushed this story 
hea-vily, claiming that the state high1>iay fund was being grossly misused 9.nd 
that :\nthon~r DiNatale, CoErrnissioner of the Department of Public \l'lor!<:s , '.•r.:>cs 
refusing to r e2.ease records that would list the persons renting equipment 
b ec.:mse he vv-as attempting to conceal the full picture until after elect,ion . 
Editorials such as t he following appe<e.red with some regulad_ty: 
I~ . DiNatale , your defi.:mce of The Herald has become a defiance of 
the people of Massachusetts . The people ha.ve a rj.eht to lmovf hovr 1-vell 
their public serva.nts are carr;ying out their responsibilities . Unless 
y()u release a current list well before the election,,.,you v·rill have 
substantielly interfered v·li th the electoral process .. ~ 
1Intervie1.·r v.rith John Hcl.llan, Poston_, December 15, 1958. 
2The Bostnn Her::tld, September 1? , 1958, p . 1.. 
Guy Rossi vias not a campaign manager, but in charge of Procurement 
and Maintenance e.t the FurcoJo for Governor Corrnnittee Headquarters on 
Boylston Street . Inter-Office Vertical Listing, October 6, 1958 . 
3The Boston Herald , September 18, 1958, p . 16 . 
Meamvhile, the candidate and his staff were busily assessing just 
how much truth there was to The Boston Herald's charges, how they would 
handle the charges, and »rhat the charges vmuld mean to the campa i gn . If 
the administration were not exonerated, this episode would be al l the more 
reason why Furcolo could not cite accomplishment as a primary campaign 
theme . 1 
On September 25, t he Governor and Commissi oner DiNatale appeared 
on a television show in vlhich Furcolo emphasized that these allegations 
\"lere intended to divert the people ' s attention from the solid 
accomplishments his administration had achieved . DiNatal e l ashed back at 
his criti cs for fabri cating lies and spreading them for political purposes . 
He said statements that he paid persons ~~1,000 for a lawn mower rental 
2 
were false . 
During this period, Governor Furcolo learned that within a fei'lf day s , 
the legislature would pass his proposed bills for programs of enormous 
importance . It »ras al so about t his time that the campaign research staff 
decided that t hey had been overly disturbed by these charges . DiNatale 
vlas more than willing to release records . The story ivas not receiving the 
state-vride publicity it v.ras feared it would recei ve . A careful examination 
of the Massachusetts dai lies was proof . This vms not a grass-roots 
rebellion as was the case in the 1952 Dever campaign, but merely an attempt 
by the Boston Herald-'l'raveler Corporation to wreck the chances for the 
1rntervie"'v with Paul HcGerigle, Boston, April 17, 1959 . 
2Television broadcast, 1,JBZ-TV, 7:30 :P .H, 1 September 25, 19 58 . 
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1 
re-election of Furcolo •1 
II This analysis was a turnLng point. Furcolo felt that the DPW 
problem could no longer be interpreted as rationale for holding back a 
I campaign plan stressing accomplishment . 2 Therefore, upon realizing that 
I the DHv charges were not as serious as originally thought, and upon learning 
of the ~~jor legislative action that was to take place, the Steering 
Corrnni ttee put into effect the campaign plan emphasizing accomplishments . 
Action was qtL-Lck, for the formal television campaign had already begun on 
September 26, \~th the programming of a live telecast which portrayed the 
Furcolo forces as united and ready for a campaign.3 
On Septerrb er 30 , testimony before a special Senate Invest:i.gation 
Committee by career employees of the Department of Public Works, proved 
:1 that costs of rental equipment had decreased in the past two years, and that 
the current rates were lower than the national level.4 On October 3, the 
!legislature passed the Massachusetts Port Authority Bill, the bill calling 
for the creation of state-wide junior colleges, and a bill corn.monly !mown 
II as the Boston package plan, which would greatly aid the revitalization of 
the city.5 
Previous plans that would be involved in a positive campaign were 
1rnterview with Paul McGerigle , Boston, April 17 , 1959 . 
2rnterviewwith Paul McGerigle, Boston, April 17, 1959 . 
3rnterview with John Mallan, Boston, December 15, 1958. 
4The Boston Record, September 30, 1958, p . 2. 
5Acts and Resolves assed b the General Court of Massachusetts in 
the year 1958 Wright & Potter: Boston, 1958 , Chapters 599, 605, and 0 ; 
pages 458, 476, and 479 respectively . 
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formally adopted . It was planned to avoid areas that Here too complex. to 
convey, such as the fiscal policy of the state . Stress was l aid upon area.s 
-v.rl'Jich everyone ~rou_l_d rn.ve a hard time denyine they are 11 for . " The Steerin..g 
Corrmlittee planned to avoid subjects which i•rere considered controversial not 
only betl.·reen Republicans and Democrats , but betvreen Democrats themselves . 
I A ..11 example of the aforementioned v.ms the sales tax controversy •1 
Also to be avoided i·Tas any major attack upon Charles Gibbons , the 
F..epublican candidate, at the start of the campaign. Gibbons WHS relatively 
un..k..nov n . The Steering Committee decided that it v,ras more to their advantag e 
n0t to attack him at this point , and thus provide him vrith mu.ch free 
publicity v.1hich would do hirn. more e;ood than the atta.ck upon him ''rould hurt . 
The attack upon the record of Charles Gibbons vra.s to be a matter of proper 
.L . • 2 
ulffilng . 
Various aspects of the administration were consi dered to be 
v-ulnerable, thus steps \vere taken to deflect the attack upon these areas 
that might be launched by the opposition . For example, the econoroic c limate 
of Hassachusetts , al 'l-iays being a controversial and spotty subject for 
discussion, vvas sure to be hit . Hence., one of the first positive claims put 
forth Nithin the television campaign, was the extolling of the creation of 
ne1-r jobs in the Corrn:nonwealt:.h of Nassachus etts ) 
1 Intervi.e1'1f 1•rith John ll1a.llan, Boston, Decemb er 15, 19 58. 
2Intervievr 1'1Tith Paul 1'-IcGerigle, Boston, April 17, 1959 . 
3rntervievl 1'Jith El1.'1Tood JVfcKen..ney , Boston, Janua:ry 19, 1959. 
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Eve~r consideraticm was taken to keep the campaign plan as 
positive as possible, stressing the accorr.plishments of the incumbent. 
Furthermore, by citing accomplishment , the policy-makers felt that the 
television programs could be provided 1·lith rnateriHl that ~rmuld have the 
greatest chance of appeali.YJ.g to an independent vote . They believed that 
vdthin the a.udience existed n hc?.rd core of Republicans and Democrats . 
Regardless of the approach used upon these groups , their traditional voting 
behavior could only be affected slightly . However , by keeping the theme of 
the campaign as posj_ti ve ns possible, the pr ograms would appeal to the 
fringe Republicans, indecisive Democrats, and m.:tinl;~,r, to the indepencl.ent 
vote.1 
Anothe r factor to be considered here , concerned that 1·Jhich Jack 
Gould mentioned, when ·~o-.rrj_ting in The Nei'l' York Times about the Nev,r York 
gubernatorial campaign. 11 [Harriman) as a veteran campaigner ••• went on 
the defensive surprisingly early . In TV it is especially important to 
accentuate the positive if a. candidate hopes to penetrate a vie1-'ier 1 s normal 
? 
somnolence . "·-
A final point should be made regarding the death of George Fingold, 
Attorney General of the Cormnoml)'ealth, the original Republican candidate, 
vmo passed away early in September . His death had but a small effect upon 
the determination of a campaign plan by Furcolo and his staff . ·H. the time 
of his dec>.th, as previously explained, Democratic strategy still was 
lrnterview vdth Harold Turin, Boston, January 12, 1959. 
2The Nev Yor!{ Times, Novenber 6, 1958, p. 75. 
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undecided over vlhether to place primary emphasis during the campaign, upon 
a positive or negative approach. If Fingold had been able to run, the 
change in the final campaign plan 1.vould h:l. ve called for an early attack 
upon his record . Fingold was a popular figure, as evidenced by the fact 
that he was the only Repili lican to win a state-wide office in the 
~fussachusetts electinns of 1956. Thus, the plan of not attacking Gibbons 
because he >'las relatively unkno~m, made no sense in the case of Fingold. 
But the major part of the campa j,gn plan would have remained intact, because 
the fornrulation of this plan was determined by previously-mentioned forces, 
and nnt by a consideration of who IITould be the opposing candidate. 
Horeover, the same attacks upon tre Governor o-.ould have been e..xpected 
regardless of the opponent.1 
The campaign was now ready to swing into operation, and to proceed 
along positive lines. Fm~colo expected to be attacked in certain areas , 
and 1vas prepared to meet these attacks and to avoid attacking his Republican 
opponent, directly , at the start of the campaign. 
----------------------------------------------------------~ · ------
1
rnterviev.r with Joan Smith, Boston , April 13, 1959 . 
CHAPTER III 
THE MEDI'Ofi! OF TElEVISION 
One of the earliest ani most decisive steps taken during the 
prepar.:ttion stages of the CB.mpaign concerned the buying of television time . 
Regardless of the campaign plan to be decided upon, Furcolo considered it 
vital to secure television time early and be assured of having as much time 
availa'Qle as possibly could be used during the campai gn •1 
Thi:; 1-Jas a huge undertaking performec_ by the advertising agency . 
Seven stations throughout lihssachusetts , Rhode Island, and New York were 
employed : WBZ-TV and ~'JIITAC-TV in Boston ; (1JIJHDH- TV, the Herald-Traveler 
Corporation-o~med station, did not offer any time available for political 
broadcasting other than spot announcement time in the final stages of the 
campaign;) V.MI.J'- TV and ~VHYN-TiT i.11 Springfi eld ; HPHO-TV in Providence to 
reinforce coverage of the Cape Cod area; and VJRGB-TV i n Schenectady to 
reinforce coverage of the Berl<shi.re area . A period from September 12, to 
November 3, 1-1as covered, and e>.n estimated total time of twenty-four hours 
2 
and forty-five minutes was bought in behalf of Foster Furcolo. Figure 3 
shows the breakd.o-vm in programs and time , over the different stations . 
1rntervie"r 1-.rith Harold Turin, Boston, Je.nuRry 19, 1959 . 
2Based upon a compilation of the Official Television Schedule of 
Foster Furcolo . 
Gibbon ' s total television time only reached three hours and fifteen 
minutes , using vlliDI-I-TV, WNAC-TV, vlBZ-TV, and only one station in Springfield. 
He never used 1f11PRO- TV or "liJRGB-TV . Letter from Charles Gibbons to the 
writer, June 15, 1959. 
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Moreover , Harold Turin lme~r from past experience that the Pulse 
ratings of time ~ots which were politically dominated, dropped considerably 
as the campaign and television propaganda progressed , and then picked up an 
audience again in the closing days of the campaign . On the basis of this 
i!l..formation, Furcolo decided to use television fairl y heavily duri!l_g the 
first stages of the campaign, and then again in the latter stages of the 
campaign . 1 Secondly, if the deci sion-makers were to establish the proposed 
tone of the campaign, they must do i t quickly and strongly. 2 
Preempting regularl y scheduled and heavily rated programs as a 
means of gaining an a lready established audience was not faYorably 
considered. This was thought to be bad policy on the g rounds that it would 
arouse viewer resentment.3 
The Use of a TeleYision P~ogram 
Television was used in a Yariety of ways to high~ight the accom-
plishments of the administration. As compared with video-taped and l iYe 
programs, film v•as n:.ost extensively 1..~sed for this purpose. Basically, the 
format far the five-minute filmed telecast >"'"as the same for all programs . 
The theme sang of the campaign would be playing while a view of the State 
House >vas being shoi>'m on the screen. The music would fade out as the scene 
dissolved to the office of the Governor . Governor Furcolo would greet the 
audience, and explain what subject he was going to discuss . Occasionally 
linterview -with Harold Turin, Boston, January 19, 1959. 
2Intervievr w:i. th Elwood IvlcKenney, Boston, Je.nuary 19, 19 59. 
3rntervievf vlith Harold Turm, Boston, January 19, 1959 . 
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there nught be a stock fil1n insert that related to the subject being 
explained to the audience . For example , if the topic of the program 
concerned the economic climate of Hassachusetts , a l ocation shot of a nev.r 
industrial area Hould be shown. These five-minute reports from Furcolo 
covered topics dealing 1dth new industr:v- for l".iasse.chusetts , vacation and 
tourist travel, relief for the aged, higher education, and assistance from 
the Federal Government . The Governor VIOl..L1d end the program by thanking 
everyone for listening . The scene vmuld dissolve from the Governor saying 
gooc:b.1.ight to a shot of a partial outline of Hassachusetts in animation . 'l'he 
outline of the state vrould continue to take its proper shape as Paul Hiner 
announced , "Re-elect Governor Furcolo, his program meets the needs of all 
the people . 11 The theme song, the "Colonel Bogey :Harch, 11 "l'.JOuld be playing 
in the background as the scene 1trent -to black . These programs 1'Iere shovm 
from Boston and Springfield television stations throug hout the entire 
campaign, during early and late evening hours . They were intended t o 
1 
permeate the entire campaign . 
Fifteen-minute programs on film. included coverag e of such areas as 
industry, the needs of the >mrking people, higher education, tour ist travel , 
Greater Boston revitalization, and citizen participation achieve::1ents. The 
format of the fifteen-minute p:c-ograms 11as e:r..actly the same as the five-
minute shovrs, except that the use of filmed location shots vms much more 
extensively employed . 
The use of film by Furcolo afforded him thi·ee distinctive advantages 
1 rntervielf 1'<ith Harold Turin, Boston, Januar·y 19, 1959 . 
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l•lhich live television could not offer . First by not having to appear at a 
television studio on a s pecific date and at a specific tir.1e , Fur colo i'Jas 
able t o maint a in a more flexible tirr1e schedule . Thus film aided his 3.lready 
cramped campai gn schedule . Secondl y , it created a simultaneous film n eb vorl( 
for coverage of t opics throuq;hout the state . Thirdl y , it offered Furcolo 
the opportunity of perfecting a program in terms of content and pel~fnrm.ance . 
The vari able that eY..istecl in live prograrrmling could be controlled . A film 
could be discarded if the Governor 1vas not happy vr.i.th the production . Live 
television v.ras vlhat is knovm. as a "one- shot • 11 
Ne:x:t to f ilm, video-taped progr ams Vfere :most extensively u sed to 
cite a ccomplishment . This -l'las due to the creation of the Coffee with Kay 
Furcolo_ series , produced at 1tJEZ- TV, one of the few stations in thG state 
vJhich possessed a video-tape machine . The ser ies consisted of a t 1"1i.Ce-
I-Tee1dy , fifteen- rrj_nute program, in 1,·1hich the Governor ' s \>'life and other 
ci vic-rrj_nded vwmen cited accomplishments of the administration. The topics 
vrere pra.ctically i dentica l to those of the Fo ster Furcolo fifteen- rainute 
filmed telecasts . At the time of the campaign , e:;.,.'tensive use of vid eo-
t aped programs 1·ras hi ghl y i mpractical. The cost Has high , not all stations 
had video- tape machines to pl ay back the t apes , and the tline element 
invol ved in meeting station scheduling for production ~c·~ould not have 
permitted Furcolo the same amount of flexibilit ;y in his schedule as did 
fiJJn . The Kay Furcolo series was also kinescoped and distributed to 
Springfield for telecast •1 
1Interview 1dth Harold Turin, Boston , J anuary 19, 1959 . 
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Live television programs were least used to expound specifically upon 
the accomplishments of the administration. There were a few five-minute 
programs in 1-Jhich guest speakers praised Furcolo and his work, calling for 
his re-election. The same held true for some fifteen-minute programs. For 
example, in one of the closing shows of the campaign on November 2, over 
WBZ-TV, Senator Kennedy and the Governor appeared together, speaking on the 
prosperous future in store for ~..assachusetts and 1-rhat has been done to 
assure this future. However, the real importance of live television lay in 
its value as a means of instant defense and attack. A live television 
program was a combination of defending the administration by attacking the 
opposition and citing accomplishment in those areas under attack . In the 
1/ITords of Paul Miner, "There is just so much you can do with film . It is 
wonderful for laying down your positive aspects, but there reaches a point 
1 
when the Governor must go on televisi(ln live, and fire away." 
All live television production originated in Boston. Kinescoped 
!recordings were made of live shows and distributed to respective stations 
~~ for broadcast. Thus the subject matter of certain programs could be 
selective in its appeal to voters living in certain regions of the state. 
For example, the Schenectady station, w~GB-TV, telecast programs emphasizing 
travel and vacation in the Berks hires. ~v-pRo-TV in Providence telecast 
programs featuring travel and vacation themes directed at the Cape Cod area. 
No shows dealing with the revitalization of Boston were shown in Springfield: 
1Interviewwith Paul Miner, Boston, October 20, 1958. 
2Interview with Harold Turin, Boston, January 19, 1959. 
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In this respect, a campaign carried out on a national network basis is not 
afforded this advantage of appealing to the vote by emphasizing topics of 
regional interest . A program. aimed at, the American voter on a national 
nehrork hook- up has to generalize its content, and appeal to the lmvest 
common denominator fnrrrrula in its presentation, attracting all and offending 
none . 
Finally, the spot television campai:?;n originated from Boston and 
Springfield .via film. There was no deeply thought-out reasoning behind the 
spot campaign other than for additional exposure or safety saturation. 
There 'tvere four spots in all , two by Furcolo and tvm by Congressman Boland 
of Springfield , twenty seconds in length . Furcolo 1 s spots highlighted the 
amninistration and stressed the importance of getting out the vote. 
Boland 's spots 1-Jill be explained shortly . In Boston only \IIHDH- TV was used . 
In Springfield the statinns telecasting spots were VJHY!IT-TV and ~1JHLP-TV . 
VlNAC-TV does not sell political spots, and 11TBZ-TV did not have any decent 
time available . The s pot television campaign ran for the last t vm \.·reeks of 
the c2.mpai gn, an average of t •··renty- five spots per <veek per station . The 
majority of all telecasts, except spot announcements, v.rere publicized as 
to time and date by means of front page or television page nevJspaper 
advertisements . 1 
The Television Campaign 
The first telecast relating directly to the cmnpaign began on 
September 23, at 7:30 P . N. over VJBZ-TV ( Th e Kay Furcolo telecasts had begun 
on September 12). This program should be classified a s a 11 register and 
1rntervievr l·rith Harold Turin, Boston, January 19, 1959. 
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jvote kick off11 presentation. Governor F'urcolo , Senator Kennedy, Congressman 
0 1 Neill of Somerville, and T·Iayor Costain of Lynn, vrere all on hand to stress 
the importance of registering and voting , and of voting Democratic. Behreen 
this program and the program formally opening Furcolo 1 s campaign , came the 
Department of Public ~·Jorks epis ode . 
Thus on September 26, at 7:45 P . ]\f . on a Boston television station, 
~rnz , a live telecast formally opened the television campaign and the campaign 
in general . Furcolo, Campaign Director Landers, Barbara Peabody, the lrrlf e 
of Endicott Peabody, a defeated candidate in the primaries for the office of 
AttOl~ney General, and Ed1-1ard HcCormack, Jr ., candidate for the office of 
Attorney General, all appeared, not only to praise the achievements of the 
Dffinocratic aCLministration, but al so to illustrate the unity that existed 
within the Democratic party . Specifically, the show Nas an attempt to prove 
that the Peabody forces and the l'icCormack forces were all 1·mrking f or the 
good of the party, and that the defeat of Peabody by HcCormack in the 
primaries, had not split the follovrers of the Peabody camp from the 
Democratic party and the F1.1I' colo, lVIcCormack camps •1 As mentioned previously , 
it -was betvveen the date of broadcast of thi s program and October 2 , that 
campaign plans v.rere clearly formulated . 
On Oct ober 2, 3, 7, 9, 10 , 14, 15, 21, 22, and 23 , prograi11S ~orere 
presented over Boston television stations , that clearly illustrated the 
caropaign plan . Areas covered included the industrial climate of 
Hassachusetts, the gratification of the needs of the people, the expansion 
1rnterview v.rith John Hallan, Boston, December 15, 1958 . 
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of higher educa.tion, the increased amount of vacation travel and tourist 
trade in t he Corr.monwealth, the revitalization of Greater Boston, an attempt 
at explaining the fiscal policy of the state, and the work of the Citizen 
Partici pation Committee. One point should be mentioned in con_nection vlith 
the latter. The plan to avoid are-as as complex as the fiscal condition of 
the state, was ultimately rejected . The program telecast on October 21, was 
an e.ttempt by Furcolo to illustrate t o the people that he had actually 
lm..rered the state debt . Constant Republican charges that he had re.ised the 
debt provoked Furcolo to undertake this action . 1 
But all in all , the campaign vms going as planned . The Kay Fm~colo 
shm..rs vvere proceeding according to schedule . The early evening, late 
evening, and fifteen- minute programs, all of 1-vhich had been concerned vdth 
the laying of the feeling of a ccomplishment, 1i>fere being telecast according 
to schedule . 
On October 22, the calm came to an end .. Practically every paper i n 
the state carried a quarter-page advertisement which had the headline, 
"30,000 I NDUSTRI AL JOBS lOS 'I' IN l"..ASSACHUSETTS - - WILL YOURS BE NEXT?11 , 
imprinted over a broken-dol'.rn, abandoned facto!"''J buildir;g. The advertisement 
was paid for by the Massachusetts Economic Service which is a department 
of the Associated Industries of 1-Iassachusetts . The advertisement then 
continued, explaining in regular print size Nhat the re-election cf Governor 
Furcolo would mean to the public , and nnre specifically to labor . 
111,1J1en you vote in the coming election next month, make certain that 
you vote for candida-tes who 1.Jill put an end to this massacre of jobs in 
1rnterviei'r vdth <John Nallan, Boston, December 15, 19 58. 
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Massachusetts- Make certain you vote for men who know industry's 
problems and \dll assist on laws that will make it possible for industry 
in this state to compete with the rest of the nation. Nake certain you 
vote for men who are going to help YOUR employer keep YOUR job in 
Massachusetts. 
It's already too late for 30,000 jobs.1 
Also, manber companies of the Associated Industries of Massachusetts were 
responsible for the enclosing of a card within workers ' payroll envelopes 
which warned that their jobs could be next if Furcolo was re-elected.2 
I Through the use of such propaganda, AIM intended to point out to I labor that it was to their best interests not to vote for Furcolo. The 
! result was just t he opposite. Labor felt that the intrusion of AIM, 
~ representing big business, which labor felt its traditional opponent, 
1
1 
symbolized their backing of the Republican candidate, who labor felt was 
definitely opposed to their interests. The first result of the AIM can1paign 
was to mobilize labor completely into the camp of the Democratic candidate. 
Up to this point , labor had not W\'holeheartedly participated in the 
Democratic campaign, but no1.-r labor leaders who i'lere hesitant about 
enthusiastically supporting the Governor, flocked to his side to offer any 
help they could .J 
Horeover, Furcolo felt that this push by AIH would bring Gi bbons 
directly into the limelight . Any progre~ instituted directly against 
Furcolo that had the earmarks of ga].ning momentum, would be identified with 
his opponent, regardless of i'lhether or not the program had been instituted 
lThe Boston Herald, October 22, 1958, p. 22 . 
2rnterview with Paul McGerigle, Boston, April 17, 1959. 
3rnterviewwith John Mallan, Boston, December 15, 1958. 
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by his opponent . 1 Furthermore, the Gibbons' f orces had l aunched a radio spot 
campaign VJhich hit Ftu'colo hard in regard to the state debt and the DP\;f 
cha rges . The radio spot ·Hould end i.\'ith the v-rord.s , 11\'Jhy foster graft and 
corruption, i.<J"hy Foster •112 Furcolo feared that Gibbons v.ras nm,r about to make 
tremendous lleadvmy. Nov.r was the time to make use of the managemer.t- or i ented 
Gibbons voting record and attack the man) 
On October 24, the push- back began . Tr1at evening in a live 
telecast , over 'VJBZ-TV, the labor l eaders of the state : J . ~·lilliam Belanger, 
President of the state CIO , Joseph Salerno, Director o f the llmalgamated 
Clothing '.:Jorl~ers of ..z.\merica , and Francis Lavigne , Political Educatj_on 
Director for the state AFL, att acked the record of Charles Gibbons and 
strone;l y endorsed Foster F'urco l o . 
On October 25, The B<;>ston Herald published a front- page sto17 vlhi ch 
carried as its l ead , 11 Di g New Industry Drop Seen by Gibbons if Democrats 
'-"'in . ll Gibbons ' claims \lfere forceful , vivid, and picturesque . 11Hassachusel:.ts 
industry vri.ll shrink to barbershops and shoe shine stands, and 1.memplo;yment 
rolls will continue to swell unless the state administration i s overturned ~t!. 
On October 27 , the relationship betvreen the As sociated Industries 
of Nassachusetts and Charles Gibbons vl/'as more clearly drmm out . In another 
live telecast over 1'!NAC-'l'V, Belanger , Hugh Thompson, Hegional Di rector for 
the AFL-CIO, and John Callahan, President of the riassachusetts Federation of 
1It. "h n · ervl ev·r Wlt. Paul HcGeri gle, Boston, ·pril 27, 1959 . 
2Interviev,r vrl th Harold Turin, Boston, Januar-y- 19' 1959 . 
3Intervievl with John Hallan, Boston, Decembe1~ 15, 1958 . 
4The Boston Herald, October 25 , 1958, p . 1. 
labor, repudiated the job loss charges which they sa.id vrere expressed by 
Gibbons as a tool of Al}I. 
But tre Governor was still nndecided as to how much ground Gibbons 
had gained due to the efforts of Allf. When to attack and to >vhat degree 
was always determined by Furcolo, and this problem was no exception . l 
On October 29 , The Boston Herald carried as one of its front-page 
stories, the claims put forth bJ,r the General Electric Compan..y against the 
Furcolo administration. 
GE SAYS STATE INDUSTRY AILING-- HIGH TAXES, DEBT, BLAlvJED FOR LAG. 
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In a pre-election move without precedent on the part of a big 
industry, the General Electric Company, the state ' s biggest employer, 
has taken a firm stand on the campaign issue of the health of the 
Massachusetts business and industrial climate ~- and asserted it is not 
go od. It does not mention Governor Furcolo by name, but takes direct 
issue ,,.fith his contentions during the past several weeks that job-wise 
and dollar-wlse the Massachusetts industrial picture is a rosy one . 2 
The story went on to stress that in the last dozen years, 30,000 industrial 
jobs had been lost, and that 21,000 of these had disappeared during the 
Furcolo reign . In this same edition, The Boston Herald editorial reinforced 
the General Electric-Aitvi charges . 11 N'r. Furcolo found a state in need of 
industrial nourishment ,. But no tangible incentives have been given industry 
to settle or stay here, ani the prospect is for rore taxes , more social 
services for which employers must pay, more anti-employer laborism.rt3 
On October 30, and 31, Furcolo ''ras on televisinn over vffiZ-TV, live 
and firing away. He charged that this big business pressure group was using 
linterview with John :Hallan, Boston, December 15, 1958. 
2The Boston Herald, October 29, 1958, p. 1 . 
3Ibid., p. 48 . 
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inflated and inaccurate statistics about t he alleged loss of jobs in 
l•1ass a chusetts . He said t1'1a t the errors involved at l east 13, 500 jobs. 
Furcolo emphasized that off icia l United States Department of Labor figures 
shmr that JI<Iassachusetts has gai ned 41, 000 jobs since January, 1957, that 
business has invested :i?600, 000,000 here in nevf pl ant eX'_t)ansion during 19 57 
and 1958, and that l'Iassachusetts is the eighth wealthiest state i n t he nation 
in per capita income . Furcolo declared that he vJas particularly shocked that 
this "Old Guard Republican Group , 11 was attempting to intimidate thousands of 
workingmen a ll over t he state by enclos:irtg lea f lets in the:i.r pay envelopes 
v-rhich imply that if they vote for Senatnr Kennedy, himself , and other 
Democrats, they may lose their jobs . Furcolo l"fent on to attack Gibbons t 
voting r ecord in the House of Representatives , pointing out that his opponent 
voted six tim.es agai ns t increasing old age assistance benefits , t vlice against 
food allmvance increases for senior citizens , and six times against outlav-rlng 
r eli gious and racia l discrimination in employment . Furcolo Haved the House 
record in his hand and closed his hvo- day attack by stati ng excitedly a nd 
emphatically that both AIM and Gi bbons say that 111Vlassachusetts has t o stand 
still for a fe11 years on its social progress. 111 Neither The Boston Globe 
nor 'l'he Boston Herald gave any space to this retaliative effort of Fm~colo 
2 
over television . 
In retaliation to the radio spot cantpai gn bei ng waged by Charles 
Gi bbons, Congressman Boland of Spd.11.gfield f ilmed tv.Jo television s pot s 
~vBZ-TV, 7 :1+5 P . Jvi . , October 31, 1958 
2\friter ' s exa.Lilination of The Boston Globe a.nd The Boston Herald of 
Oct ober 30, and 31, 1958. 
attacking the record of Charles Gibbons . 1 
The Governor and his staff noH felt that these final efforts had 
broken 1·!.hatever i r1petus Gibbons had achieved . 2 
On November 2, and 3, Furcolo 1·ms on television again over \'JBZ-TV 
and ;.·JNf.\.C-TV, thanking everybody 1'1ho had 1-vorkecl in the carnpaign, and 
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reassuring the public that the future of Hassachusetts vms steadily grmving . 
The Television Production Process 
Furcolo and his staff employed a specific process for vJorking a 
topic into shape that was to be presented over television . The research and 
statistics involving a certain subject vras prepared by either Joan Smith, 
Kermit Horrissey , John Hallan, or Paul HcGerigle. If the topic being 
prepared was to be filrned for television presentation, then the research 
material would practically be turned into a finished script . 'l'he ne:x:t step 
vms to pass the near-finished s cript along t o Foster Furcolo, and he vmuld 
then ~.rork it over, mald.J.J.g changes if he felt they were necessary . 3 A 
shooting script >vas established by Paul ~·:liner (i. e ., determining visual 
cut-ins, close-ups, etc .). The script ·Has then transferred to the Q'l'V 
apparatus ( a teleprompter designed f or film cameras) and the filming vmuld 
begin . 4 
If the topic h'as to be p:r·esented as a live prograr.o., the script 
1rntervieH uith Harold Turin, Boston, January 19, 1959 . 
2Int ervie'ii v.r:L th Paul NcGerigle, Boston, April 1?, 19 59 • 
3rntervieu \'lith John Hall an, Boston, December 15, 19 58 . 
4rnterview v.rith Paul ¥liner, Boston, October 20, 1958 . 
See Appendix B for an &~ample of a Filmed Televis i on Prograrrt of 
Foster Furcolo, 11 Citizens 1 Participation . 11 
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remained in the research and statistics stage, right up to air-time . Even 
though Har-old Turin established a live shooting script for the television 
station director, the live shm~'S of Fur colo Here scarcely rehearsed . 
Approximately ten minutes before a show \'Jas due to be telecast, Fu:rcolo 
studied the script, v.Jhich vras basically a bunch of facts and figures in 
outline form . As the s hoH vras broadcast, a unity of topic was achieved for 
... h f. t · · 1 u e lrs ·eliDe. 
In both instances of a film or a live program, it v·ras more accurate 
to title people gathering research for these shm·rs and preparing program 
outlines, as informcrt. ion gatherers rather than script -v-Titers, because each 
shov-r had the stamp of the personality of Furcolo upon it . He took the 
outline and turned it into his O\·'i11 words and expressions . Emotional or 
dramatic appeal vias furnished by Furcolo as he felt it necessary . His 
>vri ters never indicated emphasis of certain points upon a script or outline; 
this vras left up to the candidate . 2 
The Coffee vrith Kay Flrrcolo series was another case in point. These 
programs possessed a definite style of "I'Jriting-. Issues were presented 
favorably, positively, and simply. The participants l{rJ.e>v what to say, vvhen 
to say it, and hm"l to say it. Ehmod NcKenney met ~~'i th the v'romen vJi1o were to 
appear on a certain program, the day before the taping date . The statements 
each v.roman vras to contribute vrere discussed) The program vras introduced by 
]_Interview with John I·iallan, Boston, December 15, 1958 . 
2Interview with John Hallan, Boston, December 15 , 1958. 
See Appendix C for an Example of a Live Television Program of 
Foster Furcolo, 11 iJacation Industry • 11 
3Interview v.rith Ehvood Iv.tcKenney, Boston, January 1'9, 1959 . 
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an annou.ncer as Kay Fur colo and her guests drank coffee . Hrs . Furcolo then 
addressed the vievdng audience, explainin..g Nhat subject was under 
consideration . She started off the show by asking one of her guests to 
co11.1J11ent upon the topic to be discussed . For example, if the shaH dealt \·Jith 
the expansion of higher education, she asked one of h er guests , presumably 
a leader in the f ield of education such as Dr . M. gnella Gunn of Boston 
University School nf Education, what this new legislation meant to thousands 
of qualified college applicants . The repl y was stated , and then another 
vmman joined in the conversation \·Jith another thought concerning the same 
genera l topic under discussion . And in this manner the program progressed 
f or fifteen minutes, v.Jith Hrs . Furcol o closin the show by Sillrt1llflrizing what 
had been said . 
It is interesting to note the difference that existed bet,:Teen Kay 
Fur colo and her husband . These vrere :tvirs . Furcolo 1 s first extensive campaign 
a.ppea.rances on televisinn. She vras not as dynamic a s peaker as her husband . 
Her role on the program 1•Tas to serve as hostess, and intrnduce the topic a nd 
summarize vrhat had been said . This was i n complete contrast to the Foster 
Furcolo shovm in vrhich Furcolo completely dominated the air- time , even 1·.rhen 
guests appeared ,,Jith him. He was hnst , moderatnr , and guest star all i n one. 
In terms of television production this campair~n had its 11 catchy11 
theme music and happy jingles . Film v·ras well integrated i nto shm·rs . 
However, there were many little thi ngs that v·rere vJron with various 
prnductions such as unmotivated use of visuals, or bad eye conta ct tov.rards 
the a ir camera on the part of certa in guests . But even though television 
productions v•ere not spectacular in terms of originality a..nd f inished 
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product, neither were they disastrous.1 Many 1ittle things might have been 
wrong , but nothing occurred on a program that could be classified as 
detrimental t o the total effort put forth to re-elect Furcolo . 
The inadequacy of television production can be traced primarily to 
one factor, the element of time. 11Even those who have been connected with 
television production all their lives, emphasized Harold Turin, "have no 
conception of how rushed you are for time . 11 2 More time >vould have meant 
more rehearsal, more planning, and therefore better production . 
The Cost of Television 
A total estimated amount of :~10,?62 >vas paid to 1trBZ-TV for ten 
fifteen-minute programs and one ten-minute telecast. This included double 
A and straight A time , live programs involving an additional cost for 
required rehearsal time, and filmed telecasts . Also paid to WBZ-TV was 
$9,390 for eighteen five-minute programs, involving straight A and class B 
time. In addition, a total estimated amount of :~9 ,320 1>Jas paid to this same 
station for the Kay Furcolo series. This was class C t:ime at ~~400 for 
fifteen minutes, $100 rehearsal charge, and :~82 . 50 for video-tape recording 
charges. Thus the total estimated amount paid to VVBZ-TV reached ~~29 ,4?2. 
A total estimated amount of $8,560 was paid to \rJNAC-'I'V for eight 
fifteen-rninute programs. This included double A, straight A, and triple A 
time, live programs involving additional cost for required rehearsal time, 
and filmed telecasts . 
1 Based ~pon an analysis of the writer's production sheets, a sample 
of mich appears in Appendix A. 
2
rnterview with Harold 'I'urin, Boston, January 19, 1959 .. 
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A total estimated amount of ~:il2,000 >vas p9,id to lpffiDH- TV f or the 
Boston spot television campaign . 
A total estimated amount of ~~ 2, 640 v.ras pa i d to ~·iRGB-TV in Schenectady 
for six fifteen-minute filmed telecasts at class _/'._ time . 
A total estimated amount of ~~il,825 was paid to vJPRO-TV in Providence 
for five fif teen- minute filmed telecasts and one ten-minute telecast . This 
included class B and C time . 
A total estimated amount of ~~4 ,450 was paid to VJHLP- 'l'V for sb:teen 
five- minute fiJmed telecasts , one ten-minute film.ed tel ecast , fifteen 
fifteen-minute filmed t el ecasts , and six fifteen- minute Kay Furcolo shm·lS . 
'This i ncluded class A, B, and C ti..me . 
A total estimated runolmt of ti>2 ,lle0 vras paid to ~~JHYN-TV for seven 
five- minute f ilmed telecasts , eight fifteen-minute f iJs11ed telecasts, and six 
Kay Furcolo kinescopes . 
A total estimated amount of :;n5 ,000 vras paid to HHYN- TV and vMLP- TV 
f. th s . f.' . ld .L • 1 or e pr1ngi 1e spo '-' campr:ngn . 
A total estimated amou..nt of ~pl0,374 was paid t o the Boston ne1'lspapers 
for the .front page newspaper promotion of the Foster Furcolo shmvs . In 
addition, a total estimated amount of :ip3,304 was }--aid to the Boston 
nev.rspapers for front page and tel evision page promotion of the Kay Furcolo 
shows . Thus the total estimated amount paid to the Boston newspapers reachEXi 
$13 , 678 . 
1 Based upon a compilation of Foster Furcolo 1 s television schedule 
and station time- rates . 
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A total estimated amount of ~ 3,780 1.;as paid to The Springfield Union 
for the television page promotion of the Foster Furcolo and Kay Furcolo 
fifteen-minute programs . 
A total estimated amount of $134 was paid to The New Bedford 
Standard Times and 'l'he Fall River Herald for television page promotion of' 
the Foster Furcolo fifteen-minute programs broadcast from 1-JPRO in Providence. 
A total estimated amount of :fp50 was paid to The Berkshire Eagle and 
The North Adams Transcript for television pa.ge promotion of the Foster 
Furcolo fifteen-minute programs tel ecast from l'ffiGB in Schenectady •1 
Co115ressi onal Studios Inc . , received approximately $500 for a few 
five-minute fiJins they had produced . Ne.gna Film Productions Inc., received 
I 
approximately ~p6,000 for the thousands 
Trans- Radio Productions Inc ., received 
I production services . 2 
of feet of film they had shot . 
approximately ~p25 ,000 for their 
Thus the estimated total cost of television time was ~~76,087. The 
estimated total cost of newspaper promotion was ~\;17 ,642 . The total 
estimated cost of television production services v.ras $>31, 500 . The total 
cost of the television campaign was ~pl25 , 229 . See Figure 4. 
The total cost of the entire mass media campaign was ~~289 ,231. In 
addition to television, this included ~~6L1. , 071 for radio, 3 ~~64,071 for 
lBased upon Foster Furcolo 1 s television schedule, nevmpaper promot ion 
philosophy of the television shows, and combined line-rates of the newspapers 
purchased for promotion . 
2Based upon company charges for various production services. 
3Based upon Foster Furcolo 1s radio schedule and station time-rates. 
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newspaper advertisements, 1 and iii37 , 860 for outdoor· advertising. 2 This means 
that television accounted for 43% of the entire mass media costs, radio 22%, 
newspapers 22%, and outdoor advertising 13%. If it can be believed, as 
mentioned to the writer in political circles, that the entire cost of the 
campaien totaled ~11 ,200,000, then television amm.m.ted to approximately 10% 
of this cost, and the entire ma8s media amotmted to approximately 25% of this 
cost. In this light, it must be remembered that various expenses eY.ist which 
lare .caused by the use of the mass media , but are not directly attributed t o 
media costs. For example, the salaries of the people employed in the Public 
ReJ.a. t ions Divis ion are considered as part of the general cost of campaigning . 
Finally, the agency derived its remuneration from its respective 15% 
conmissions, and in this sense cid not add to the cost of campaignine. 
lEased upon amount of newspaper advertising and nev.rspaper line-rates . 
2Based upon amount of outdoor advertisine and company charges . 
Figure 4 
BREAKDO\tJN OF TELEVISION STATION TIME, NE..WSPAP:ER ADVERTISEMENTS 
PROHOTING TV PROGR/!.113 > AND TELEVISION FILM PRODUCTION COSTS. 
Station Time and Rehearsal Costs 
WBZ-TV ••••••••••• ._ .•••••••••••••••••••••••• • $29 , ~.72 
VJ'Nl1C-TV .. •••••••••••• ~ •••• a ...... " • • • • • • • • • • .. • 8, 560 
WHDH-TV ••••.•••••.•••••• $•••••••a•v••••••••• 12,000 
'WR.GB--TV • •••• til •• •••••• ~ •••••• a ••••••••••••• - • 2, 640 
l,VPRO-'I'V • ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ., • • • • • • 1, 825 
WVVLP- TV •• '· • II • ~ .............................. . 
\ffiYN-TV ....................................... . 
1tJI.'JLP-TV & \ffiYN-TV (Spots ) ••••••••••••••••••• 
Total Station Time and Rehearsal Costs 
4,450 
2,lh0 
15,000 
Cost of Nev.rspaper Ads Promoting Television 
BOSTON ~~vSPAPERS • ••••• • •••••••••••••• • ••••• $13 , 678 
The Springfield Union. ... .. ................. 3, 780 
The N e'"' Be~forr:J. __ Sta.ndar d Times •• • • • • • • • • • • • • 134 The Fall River Herald ••••••••••••••••••••••• 
1be Berkshire Eagle ••••••••••••••••• ~······· 50 
The North Adams 'franscriEt ••••••••••••••••• ·----
Total Ne~rspaper Promotion Costs 
TV Film Production Costs 
Trans-Radio Productions Inc ••••••••••••••••• $25,000 
Magna Film Productions Inc •• •• •••••••••••••• 6,000 
Congressional Studios Inc . ... ............... 500 
Total Film Production Costs 
Grand Total 
~~ 76,087 
$ 17,642 
$ 31,500 
CHAPTER IV 
ANALYSIS OF THE TELEVISION CA.iYiPAIGN 
The success of the television progr amming lay in its relationship 
to the total politica l envirorunent. The performance of the Governor alvmys 
suited the situation . If the show Has on film and positive in its message , 
Furcolo presented himself to the public as calm, sincere, and explanatory . 
But he ;·ras capable of rising to different levels of expr ession, as he was 
stimulated by the existing polit ica l situation . Th e charges by AI N 
motivated him to launch an atta.ck . The supposed gains being made by Gi bbons 
provided the impetus for Furcolo to hold back very little . His anger at the 
charges put forth by ATI-I and Gi bbons 1tTaS apparent on the screen . His attacks 
upon Gibbons' votLDg record were driving and hard . He r eached the peak of 
his performance during the broadcast of the tvm live programs over HBZ- TV 
on October 30, and 31, firing away at AIN and his opponent. Anyone >'rho 
vieHed these telecasts saw the anger and e.x:citernent voiced by the Governor 
in these attacks . 
I f tvm vrords described this campaign they ivould have to be 
11 direction11 and "pacing . " To a degree, the meaning embodied in these vlords 
was pla nned, and to a larger degree, this. was the result of the tactics of 
the opposit ion. The direction Furcolo chose to pursue was determined early 
in the campaign when he decided to set forth the accomplishments of his 
a~~inistration. The issues were defined and expounded upon in a clear-cut 
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fashion, assisted, no doubt, by the attacks made upon Furcolo' s adminis-
tration by his opponent and by AHL These attacks could not have provided 
more proper ammunition to give the campaign a sense of pacing . What occurred 
was that during the first couple of 1-veeks, the Democrats laid down a ground-
1-rork of accomplishments . Just at the time that the decision-makers felt 
overconfidence creeping into the ranks and into the Democratic vote, the AI H 
advertisements v!ere printed, and the campaign 1<Ta.s off and running in an up-
hill fashion, culminating in the Governor's final attacks upon Gibbons and 
AIM . If the television campaiGn ,,rere compared to a dramatic presentation 's 
storyline, it could be said that the theme "ras bared, a crisis occurred, 
and was successfully resolved in a climactic fashion. 
No one ca.n say that because of one specific television program 
Governor Furcolo ;,vas re-elected_, but the tota.l planning and execution of 
the television campaign must be considered as a factor in accounting f or 
t he wirming vote amassed by the incumbent •1 
This analysis shotud be carried two steps further, a.11d be applied 
both to t he entire mass media campaign (television , radio, newspaper 
advertisements, and billboard a dvertising), and to the general campaign 
effort involving speeches~ rallies, and direct mail literature . 
The radio a i!'V'Taves •·rere filled with slogans and songs that urged 
the re-election of Foster Furcolo for Governor . Perhaps the most unique 
aspect of the entire mass media campaign was Furcolo's reporting of the 
lFoster Furcolo's total vote reached 1,067,020 as compared with 
Gibbons' 818,463. State Election Cormnission records . 
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nevls, :Honday through Friday, at hielve noon and 5:00 P . H., over the Yankee 
Neth'ork, throughout the entire campaign . 1 The 5:00 P .~ . prograrn vJas a taped 
repeat of the tvielve noon progre.m. In some cases, the tl.velve noon sh01v was 
ta!)ed over the telephone , depending on the C...:!.overnor 1 s schedule . Furcolo , in 
a ne1vs-style delivery , divided the pro.;rarn into three segments . First, he 
presented t he top story of the day , then the legislative nevJS of the day, 
and finally , a political anecdote . 'l'his presentation vms the peak of shmv-
manship during the entire campai gn . It was original , polished , and_ 
interesting . 
Front page advertisement s coincided 1:Jith the Governor Is effort to 
negate the charges of AIH and e:x:pose the ultra-consel~vative voting record 
of Charles Gi bbons . These advertisements vfere a quarter- page in size , and 
1 b . 2 enclosed the record of Char es Gi bans in a thlck, black border . 
Direct mail literature poured forth in volu_rninous nL3.ilings . 
Brochures and pamphlets vlere sent out t hroughout the state i"lhich pointed out 
the future of Boston, exposed the record of Gibbons , and praised the 
sincerity and courage of Foster Fur colo , the man vrho 1'ras f or 11 all the people 
of IV!:assachusetts . 11 These pamphl ets reinforced every program of accom-
plishment that had been emphasized by Furcolo during the mass media 
campaign, and restated any attacks made via television against Gibbons ) 
1-,JNAC i n Boston, I·.JETI"I in Fitchburg , ~-lALE in Fall River, ··;1111. I in 
Greenfield , HOCB i n Hyan..nis , ':lLIJ-I in Lm:Jell , VJHlvffi in Northampton , 'ltffiRK in 
Pittsfield, \r·Jl'IAS in Springfield, \1-lil.l?E in vJare, and l{J\t\B in Horcester. 
2The Boston Globe, October 31, 1958, p . l. 
See Appendi:K D for a Sample NeNspaper Campaign Advertisement . 
3Parn.phlets received in the mail by the 1-.rriter . 
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In comparison to television, direct m il literature vias aimed e.t 
very specific groups . Jewish families received newsletters invokine; the t~se 
of emotional syrnbolism. Governor Furcolo would be photographed with Harry 
Truman, and there 1'-'0uld be some mention made of Furcolo 1 s assistance to 
Zionist and Israeli !'lovements . Portugues e fami l ies received letters 
ernphasizine; the need to re-elect Furcolo The letters 1•TOuld be signed by 
prominent leaders of the Portuguese community. 'felevision programs were 
never aimed at any more of a specific group than the general public, the 
business connmmity, the independent vote, the Democratic faithfuls, or 
labor . Furthermore , no political communication ever put out by Furcolo and 
his staff , ~1ualled the degree of threat that was expressed in the IM 
charges . 
The importance of Senator Kennedy appearing on television with 
Furcolo, in direct mail literature, and on billboards cannot be over-
emphasized . In 195h, Kennedy declined to endorse Furcolo over Saltonstall. 
True , Furcolo 1 s loss cannot be attributed solely t o this factor , but it must 
be taken i nto a ccount . I n this campaign, before it was even kno-wn \·That the 
campaign plan wmld be, the Governor and the Senator \'fere appeari..ng on 
billboard advertis jn g together. 
As mentioned earlier, the scope of the general campaign organization 
was extensive . Even though the campaign was fought over television, the 
Governor still maintained a heavy 11 meet t he voter" schedule. R llies , 
meetings, and speeches intended for specific groups \<Tere quite in order . 
In this respect, the headquarters organization utilized the field forces 
in a traditional sense . Furcolo 1 s da.y included as varied a schedule as 
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being in Burlington in the morning for dedication ceremonies for the Radio 
Corporation of .~erica Engineering Laboratories , traveling to Taunton for a 
reception prepared by the tmm1 s state representative, going on to Brockton 
to address the Demosthenes Democratic Club at the Greek Commu..rri.ty Center, 
riding fran there to Avon for a Tov-m. Col!l111ittee reception, and finally ending 
up in Boston at the John Hancock Building for a reception to the United 
States Senators and Congressmen from Massachusetts by the Veterans of World 
War I of the United States of .1\m.erica Incorporated.1 
Outdoor rallies culminated the general campaign proceedings. It 
was not uncommon during the latter days of the campaign to see newspaper 
ad vert i seiTE nt s such as the fo llo1or.L11g : 
or, 
Tonight, Wednesday, 8 p .m. 
D~DCRATIC RALLIES 
FURCOIO - KENNEDY - lvicCORt..fA.CK 
and the entire Democratic ticket 
WARD 21 
Brighton Hunicipal Bldg . , Chestnut Hill Ave . 
WARD 22 
Brighton Lithuanian Club Hall, Lincoln St . 
United Greek Connn . , 257 Comrnomrealth Ave ., 
Boston2 
1
official Campaign Schedule of Foster Furcolo, October 22, 1958. 
2 The Boston Globe , October 29, 1958, p . 1 . 
Tonight, Friday 
DEMOCRATIC RALLI ES 
Hear 
FURCOLO - KENNEDY - McCORMACK 
and the entire ticket 
1'iards 4, 5, 10 (Roxbury) 
Fernwood Manor, HuntLngton Ave., Corner Tremont St . 
Ward 8 - Roxbury 
Jefferson Club, Dudley St ., Corner of Dearborn 
Wards 11, 19 - Forest Hills 
Metropolitan Hall, Hyde Park Ave . 
Ward 20 - 1riest Roxbury 
K. of C~ Hall, Park St., near~Centre. 1 
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The effect of television upon this traditional campaign procedure has 
not been to negate it completely, but to reduce it to some degree . ~Vhereas 
before television's dominance on the campaign front, certain areas and 
groups required three visits, no\<r campaign procedure only necessitated one 
visit . Thus, television reduced the length of time required to campaign. 
The exposure on television >.Yas considered more vital than barnstorming 
intensively. But the fact remains that the Governor considered it important 
2 to g et the feel of the crm.;d and to meet the people . 
There was a difference to be noted in the manner in "l'ihich the 
Republicans and Democrats deployed their candidates on these barnstormL'1g 
stops. The Democrats spread their candidates out around the state. If 
Foster Furcolo was in Brockton, 1>1cCormack might be in Revere, and Ken..nedy 
in 1forcester. Then the or der changed. On the other hand, the Republicans 
concentrated their men in one area . While this l atter procedure wight have 
created more desire in the voter to turn out for the rally because an entire 
1The Boston Globe, October 31, 1958, p . 1. 
2rnterview with Paul McGerigle, Boston, ~ay 13, 1959. 
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state ticket was present _, it did not give off the sa.JTie feeling of state-v.Ji.de 
activity as did the Democrats I pr0cedure . 1 
It also must be pointed out that the Republi can candidate offered 
ver·y little opposition t0 Furcolo . The Gibbons campaign 1~~Tas characterized 
by both lacx of time and lack of money . Fineold 1 s dec:1th occurred during the 
l a bor Day Vfeekend . Bet-v-reen this d.e.te and the prirnarJr on September 15, 
Charles G-ibbons ener , ed as the Republican c.e.ndidate _, bea.t:i.ng out Christian 
1 Herter , Jr . _, former member of the Governor ' s Council , and John Volpe_, Jr ., 
forrr.er Department of Public Harks Conrrnissioner . Gibbons 1-vent on to capture 
the primary as a sticker candidate . 
But to begin organizi.Dg a campai~n .force at this late elate , proved 
to be an insunno1mtabl e task . During th(~ last ~.<reek in the campaign, 
Professor Samuel G. Atkinson of Boston University, a former Republican state 
represent tive _, was called upon by the Gibbons people to see if he could 
>vrite e. speech about education for the candidate , a nd to see if he c')u..ld 
also help r~•. ise t -he money that v.rould enable Gibbons to deliver the speech v-ia 
televis:L •n . !1Jeedless to say, it Nas impossible at this late date for 
Professor Atkinson to do either of these things . 2 
Gibbons I a.nsvrer to the 11 Black Record" advertisements had to be 
r elegated to A.dvert.isements on ne\<Vspa.per pages other than the front page, 
a.s 1vere Fv.rcol0 1 s . He just could not. a.fford t'he front page . Apparently, 
the money behind Fingolcl fnr Governor, never found its 1,vay into the Gibbons I 
1 Intervie>'T ~·rith Paul NcGerigle , Boston, Hay 13, 1959 . 
2rntervie~v with Sanmel G .. Atkinson , Boston , Nay 11, 1959 . 
= 
1 
camp. 
\ftlhen Gibbons did appear on television, he never displayed the 
forcefulness, conviction, and vigor which l'lere characteristic of the 
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Furcolo television p ersonality. Nor did Elmer Nelson, Republican candidate 
for Lieutenant Governor, help Gibbons 1 chances \·rhen he appeared on 
television . Nelson was a stout, balding, middle-aged man. His television 
delivery was exl:.remely rough, and he lisped occasionally. On the other 
hand, the Democratic candidate for Lieutenant Governor, Robert Murphy, did 
' ? 
not appear on television, because he '\"i"as neither articulate nor colorful . -
Gibbons I organization was of a fair size considering the conditions, 
but it lrias not to be compared to the vmll-financed, issue-directed, 
campa i gn-hardened force behind the incumbent. 
1
rnterviev.r, Boston , Hay 18, 1959 . 
2rnterview with John N:alla.11, Boston, December 15, 1958 . 
CHAPTER V 
SUMIV\:ARY AND CONCLUSI ONS 
Furcolo and his staff struck a balance between traditional forms of 
campaigning and campaigning via television. Speeches , rallies, and meetings 
on the Nard level were extensive~ but took second place to the importance of 
campaigning ;_ria television . This was related t o va rious factors . 
A Democratic candidate cannot, at t he present time, depend 
upon the Democratic State Committee to provide him with an organization . 
Furcolo ' s organization gained its strength from its headquarters people and 
1 
not from its field forces. 
Various member s of the executive staff felt that any vote a 
ward boss or precinct organization promised to deliver would have gone to 
Furcolo anyway . 
Furcolo possessed a personality capable of handling the 
medi urn . He 1-.as an effective speaker, an a ccomplished debater ~ and h e 
believed very deeply in the fact that television arrl its appeal to larg e 
audiences was the most effective means of campaigning in this day and age. 
Furcolo 1<ras no nevrcomer to television , having used t he medilun, extensively, 
to campaign since 1954. 
The use of television assured Furcolo of carrying a complete 
campai~n ba.ttle to the public . There was only one ne•t~spaper in the state 
l t hat openly supported Furcolo's candidacy. 
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Television \vas employed because it 1vas an existing and 
availabl e mediu..'Il of communication . Therefore , the impa ct of the Republican 
candidate' s use of the medium, had to be countered by at least an equal use 
the medium by Fur colo . 
The effect of t el evision upon traditional campai gn procedure has not 
been to negate it compl etely , but t o reduce it to some degree . ~Thereas 
before television's dominance on the campaign front, certain areas and 
groups required three v-isits , nmv campai gn procedure only necessitated one 
visit . 
The Television Campaign 
The candidate decided to employ a campai gn plan that emphasized the 
I positive accomplishments of 
vmich featured "negativism" 
his · pa st administration, rather than a plan 
as its mai n theme . Various facts of politica l 
life had to b e faced in the attempt to decid e upon this approach. Furcolo 
had to consider 1rih. ether or not the past record of his administration , or his 
present polit ical situation, 1·1farranted such a plan . Other considerat ions 
of the plan included such decisions as to avoid areas of discussion too 
compl ex to convey, avoi d controversial subj ects , not to attack t he 
Republican candidate at t he outset of the campai gn , and to t ake step s to 
deflect any attack that mi g ht be l aunched by the opposition UiJOn vulnerable 
areas o f the administrat ion . Therefore , every step 1,vas taken to keep the 
campaign plan as positive as possible, stressing the accompli shments of the 
incumbent . Furthermore , by citing 11 accomplishment, 11 Furcolo felt that a 
television progr am would have t he greatest chance of appea ling to the 
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largest number of voters. As long as there v.ras honest motivation to stress 
the achievements of the administrat ion, tlus Nould be the plan . 
An estimated total time of tlventy- four hours and forty-five minutes 
was bought in behalf of Foster Furcolo on television stations, \iJi\JAC , i'JBZ , 
and \tiHDH in Boston, vi\rJLP and l .JHYN in Springfield, HPRO in Providence, and 
VIRGE in Schenectady. The esti1nated total cost of the television campaign 
Has ·:f1125, 229 . This wa.s 43% of the entire mass media campaign, and 
approximately 10% of the entire campaign cost . 
Fur colo used film on television for the purpose of laying the 
aforementioned base of positive accomplishments . These programs vfere five 
and fifteen minutes in length. The format consisted of Furcolo addressing 
the people and the integration of filmed location shots . Film afforded 
the candidate certain advantages which live television could not offer . 
However, the import~nce of live television lay in its value as a means of 
i nstant defense and attack . On live programs , the Governor generall y 
defended his administration by attacking the opposition and citing his mm 
accomplishments in those areas under attack . Video-tape recordings were 
also extensively used to cite the accomplishments of the administration . 
This was accomplished, primarily, by the series Coffee with Kay Furcolo, 
a fifteen-minute program which -v.ras video- taped for broadcast twice \'Veekl y . 
The spot television campaig n was instituted for the purpose of 
achieving additional exposure . The spots both highlighted the 
administration and were a means of defense and attack . 
Television production 1>1as neither s pectacular nor highly finished, 
but nothing occurred on any of the progralllS that could be classified as 
76 
detrimental to the total effort put forth to re-elect Fur colo . Hovrever , 
the success of the television campaign vvas primarily due to the performance 
of Foster Furcolo and the manner in which he used television to counteract 
the existing political enviro~~1ent . The total planning and execution of the 
television campaign must be considered as a fa ctor in a ccounting for the 
vd11..ning vote amassed by the incumbent . 
Other factors that must be considered in accounting for this vote 
include the radio campaign, the direct mail campai gn , the endorsement of 
Furcolo by Senator Kennedy , the disorganization of the Republican campaign, 
the activities of traditional campaigning , and the ne,..rspaper advertising 
attacking the Republican candidate . 
The Problem of Oversimplification 
At the outset of this study, the point was roo.de that the advent of 
the political communications specialist has contributed to a reinforcement 
of the problem of oversimplification which has constantly hampered the 
working gears of a true democracy . 1 
In the Furcolo campaign, however, a sincere effort lfas put f orth 
to educate the voter -- to explain to him v.lhat the issues -vmre all about . 
As a result of this campaign, B. voter vrould have no one to blame, other than 
himself , for not kno1dng 111hat he ;-ras supporting if he happened to vote 
Democratic . The program presented on the fiscal policy of the state >fas a 
prime example of this . Some of Furcolo ' s advisors suggested that he not 
even bother to attempt such a presentation, but the Governor felt 
differently, and went ahead for fifteen minutes , employing visuals cramrned 
1supra , introduction, pp . 9-11. 
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full of fact s and figures, in his endeavor to show to the voters that he had 
lowered the state debt . 
His attacks upon the Republican candidate wel~e not reduced to 
emotional slogans and simpli fied issues . Furcolo cited s pecifically and 
accurately vrnat his opponent, r·Ir . Gibbons , had voted against when Gibbons 
vms a member of the General Court. 
The Decisi on-r·Iaking Process 
Perhaps the most striking conclusion i•Jhich can be dravm from this 
case study concerned the problems regarding the decision-making process •1 
It >vas the Democratic candidate 1 s organization that formed a public 
relations division . 'rhe men vrithin this organization were directly 
responsible to Fur colo . Except for one advertising :man , one film specialist, 
and one script- -vn·iter, the division consisted of men that were politically 
directed . They vrere held responsible for their actions to Fur colo, and the 
candidate vias responsible to the people . Even then, the three professiona.l 
corrmmnicat ors v1er e incorporated i'rithin the overall framevvork of' the Public 
Relations Division . 
Candidate Furcolo made the decisions leading to the emphasis upon 
a ccomplishments as the primary theme of' the carn.paign plan . The candidate 
decided to use the voting record of his opponent as a legitimate means of 
attack . Furcolo decided to attempt to explain the fiscal policy 0f the 
state to the public . The candidate was his mm director vrhen he appeared on 
television . He decided how to pace himself, how to eATress himself 
1supra, introduction, pp . 5-8 . 
forcefully, and "~Hhen to i nject emotion into his presentations . He was his 
ovm political communications speciali st . 
In conclusion, the vvri ter hopes that this case study 1rdll 
contribut e to a body of knovrledge that will gu i de the principles of both 
the politician and political conununica tions speci a l ist -- that the 
politicianrs u se of the medium should be logicall y pl anned , s ensibly moti-
vated, and well executed -- that he should realize the dangers involved 
i n not controlling his campai gn -- that he can provide the public vri th a 
substantial amount of i nformation and still volin an election that he be 
both ethical and honorable in his work as a public servant, as well as 
during the days of a campai gn. 
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APPENDIX A 
S.t\ll!PLE TELEVISION PHJDUCTION AND CONTEN T ANALYSIS SHEET 
CATEGORY ADJECTIVE 
Lighting excellent 
Camera Hark good 
Sound fair 
I Iv!usic good 
I scenic Design excellent 
Pacing excellent 
Graphics excellent 
j Composition fair 
Cutting Technique good 
evenly lighted - not flat 
good picture quality - no hot spots 
steady movement in to close-ups 
change in levels of sound on film 
standard OEening and closing theme 
Governors office rich in appearance 
location shots interesting 
emphatic at certain points - timing good 
no lagging spots of narration 
figures in animation for illustration 
close-ups too close 
unpleasant picture of the Governor 
good use of film inserts - smooth transitions 
E :=;o.tY..::::e~C:.::::o !c:n~t::::a:.:::c .:::t:...__ _ __:e:.:.;x:.::c;.;:e;::l:.:l:..:e;:::n:...:t;__.__:d .::i:.::r...::e:..::c:..::t;_::c...::o;:::n:..:t=ac t w.:.::i:..:t:;:.h::....::a::u::d::i:.:e:;:.n:.:c:.:e:.._ ______ _ 
October 2, 1958 WBZ-TV - 7:30 p.m. 
Foster Furcolo a.>1d filmed location shots 
I 
Topic - ''Growth of Industry in 
Massa.chuset ts" 
Content - figures from Federal Bank illustrating growth of industry in 
Massachusetts -- how industrial expansion benefits you -- number 
of new plants -- expansion of trucking in&1stries -- specific 
towns mentioned -- why companies choose Massachusetts -- the 
expansi~n of the Department of Commerce -- vacation and travel as 
the third largest industry in the state -- The New York Times 
supplement on Massachusetts vacations -- World Trade Center --
Small Business Investment Act --
APPEI\TDIX B 
EXPJ.fPIE OF A FILMED TELEVISION PROGRAI..f OF FOSTER FURCOLO, 
"CITIZENS' PARTICIPATION"]_ 
Announcer: Tonight Foster Furcolo reports to you on his Citizens' 
Participation Programs in government . He ha.s obtained the 
volm~eer services of outstanding citizens to help ~mssachusetts 
with manJr major programs at no cost to our taxpayers. Here is 
Governor Furcolo reporting to you now. 
Governor: Good evening, ladies and gentlemen . In nw Special Mes sage to the 
General Court in January, 1957, I said, 11 1 believe that the more 
people get a1,vay from the government, the more government gets 
away f rom the people . We need the benefit of the ability and 
1958. 
the knowledge, the experience and the \visdom of public-spirited 
citizens in private life . As Chief Executive I intend to call 
upon private citizens to aid us in the solution of particular 
problems ." 
Since that time I have invited the cooperation and participation 
of hundreds of outstanding private citizens on a non-partisan 
basis on many of the major issues facing Massachusetts today. 
These programs have been of great benefit to state govern_ro_ent 
and have saved our taxpayers thousands of dollars . Tonight 
I would like to report to you on some of these fine results of 
my Citizens ' Participation Program. 
In the fields of business and industr y we have done a great deal 
through Citizens 1 Participation to promote the advantages of 
Massachusetts and to make our state even more at tractive for new 
industry . One such program vm.s the Conference on Atomic Energy 
which was held at M.I.T. last year . 
Novr, :!I:Iassachusetts has a reputation for skilled i ndustF<J, and i t 
i s important that we maintain and i mprove our competitive 
position among the states . .~_t the Atomic Ener gy Conference we 
were f or tunate to have some of the most outstanding experts i n 
the nation discussing the many peaceful uses for the atom, and 
Nhat a.toiDic-power ed i ndustry can mean to the future of 
1s cript of a Program Telecast over ~'ffiZ-TV, 7:30 P .M.~ October 23 , 
en 
1>1assa.chusetts. Such outstanding experts as Dr . Niels Bohr a!ld 
Dr. Vannevar Bush volunteered their services for this Conference . 
Meeting together here were leaders from every group in 
Massachusetts. The proe;ram 1.ofas an outstanding success, and we 
intend to continue our efforts to promote the research facilities 
aTld other advantages which v-rill make Massachusetts a leader in 
this very specialized field. But we haven ' t stopped there, we 
have undertaken many other programs to encourage the development 
of our Massachusetts economy. 
One of my first a.ctions in 1957 was to invite the help of leading 
private businessmen -- both Democrats and Republicans -- in 
selecting the finest ne>v Commissioner of Commerce vrho coulc be 
found o I am happy to report that non-partisan committee made an 
outstanding selection in Corrnnissioner John Burke. Since that 
time he has \vorked very closely >'lith these leaders to promote the 
interests of Massachusetts . 
One important cooperative effort has been the Governor's Advisory 
Committee on Industrial Development . I appointed these men for a 
single, common purpose, to build up the Massachusetts economy. 
Here are some films of a Conference vJhich we held to encourage 
new ideas and to invite their strong support and participation in 
attracting mny ne\v firms int o ~1assachusetts. This means more 
jobs for Massachusetts and an upgrading of our entire 
Massachusetts economy. 
Another outstanding illustration of >vhat Citizen Participation 
can mean for Massachusetts can be seen in this Ne1v York Times 
Industrial Supplement .( HOLDS UP MAGAZINE) Now "re wanted to have 
the largest and best magazine possible, but we could never have 
received such fine results alone . 
Nore than ninety per cent of the entire cost of this publication 
was paid for , not by the Department of Commerce, or the taxpayers 
of Hassachusetts, but through the enthusiastic cooperation of so 
many private businesses, organi zati ons , and other industrial 
groups 
We have also sponsored an Advisory Committee on Vacation Travel . 
As you may lmcM, the tourist industr y is the third largest 
industry in Massachusetts. An increase in vacation travel brings 
new tax revenue into our state, more jobs for our citizens , and 
a great many other indirect benefits to the Massachusetts 
economy. 
These films were taken at a conference held in Pittsfield. 
Citizens up there are >vorki ng very hard to promote vacation 
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travel throughout the Berkshires. I had an opportunity to speak 
with them at their conference. Just as John Downing and others 
have v.rorked so hard for the Berks hires, as indicated by these 
scenes, so have businessmen from Cape Cod vmrked to promote their 
area, and many others to promote the attractions in every region 
of Hassachusetts. In their efforts they have received the 
continued encouragement and cooperation not only from the 
Department of Commerce, but also from the Governor's Office. 
All o f the programs which I have so far mentioned are new 
progr ams established under the Furcolo administration. These 
non-partisan efforts have greatly assisted the Hassachusetts 
economy at little or no cost to Nassachusetts taxpayers. Indeed, 
most of these men receive such high salaries that state government 
could never hope to obtain their expert services in competition 
with private business. That is the .-ronderful part of my Citizens' 
Participation Program - th.eir efforts have been given on a 
voluntary basis. · 
There are many other areas of state government where }.fassachusetts 
has been helped through greater citizen participation. One such 
field is that of higher education. 
Last fall, in conjunction with the preparation work being done 
for my Special l-iessage on Higher Education, I caLled the first 
Governor's Conference on Public Higher Education ever held in 
the history of Massachusetts . Present at that Conference were 
outstanding educators and businessmen, state legislators, members 
of Parent-Teacher Associations, and other interested citizens 
from every part of Massachusetts. This Conference was conducted 
on a completely non-partisan basis, as you can see from the many 
familiar faces in attendance. 
The Governor's Conference on Higher Education was a very important 
milestone in the history of state education . It brought together 
the Presidents of public and private colleges in 1~fassachusetts to 
discuss the role and contributions of state-supported higher 
education. 
It helped enlightened citizens from every walk of life to under-
stand better the many aspects of public higher education. Here, 
for instance, is a seminar on the role of the Press in helping 
the public to become more aware of the educational challenge 
which faces us . 
Since my community college system has been passed, this program 
will get under way almost immediately. I hope to continue to use 
the voluntary services of these leading experts on related 
programs in the future . Equally pressing is the challenge to 
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mruce s ure that no capable young person is prevented from getting 
a college education simply through lack of funds . As f ar back as 
my congressional days I have >vorked to increase educational 
opportunities for our youth . l'lhen I became Governor last year, 
I r equested the establishment of t wo public s cholarship boards to 
help as many deserving and needy students as possible . 
But t hat •~s not enough . I also called together t he leading 
educators and philanthropists in Massachusett s . I told them what 
the State with its limited resources was attempting to do to help 
our young people, and then I asked them to do even more -- to 
establish a private fund-raising organization to help many more 
young men and v-10men from Hassachusetts. 
~vhat lrvas the outcome of this? A group of private citizens from 
business, labor, finance, law and other f ields raised over a 
quarter-of-a-million dollars within a single year . Working 
cooperatively and on a non-partisan basis, these outstanding 
citizens helped more than two hu..TJ.dred Massachusetts high school 
seniors over the financial hurdle of going to college -- and all 
of this has been done at no cost to our taxpayers. For its 
outstanding efforts, the Hassachusetts Scholar ship Foundation 
deserves the gratitude of everyone in our state . The public-
spirited program of these outstanding private citizens is nm·t 
being watched throughout the nation . 
There are many other ways in >vhich we have used the services of 
a~erts to improve the quality of state government. At the 
present time, for instance , ,,re are seeking for a new 
Commissioner of Public Health . tve are extremely f ortu..TJ.ate to 
have had the assistance here of some of the most prominent 
doctors in ~~ssachusetts, including the Deans of Harvard, Tufts 
and Boston University Schools of Medicine as well as other 
leading Harvard physicians and so..rne outstanding private doctors . 
Civil Ri ghts represenGs another important f ield where we had the 
stimulation of new ideas and suggestions for new and finer 
programs through increased citizen participation . 
This year \ve held the first Governor ' s Conference on Civil 
Rights in lfu.ssachusetts in thirteen year s . 
This Conference was attended by some of the most distinguished 
leaders in the field of civil rights in Massachusetts. One of 
the remarkable features of this conference was that about half 
of those attending the Conference were businessmen, bankers , 
those in real estate. Representatives of these groups are now 
becoming active in work to eliminate racial discrimination from 
our public life. 
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I called this conference, as Governor , to ask for recommendations 
for executive and legislative action to bring our civil rights 
lai'I"S up-to-date. I am pleased to report that this conference was 
one of the :rrost successful in history. 
In the field of correction, vle have been able to make rapid stri~ 
tovrard new programs largely because of the outstanding work of the 
Advisory Committee on Building Needs in the Department of 
Correction. Our correctional system has long needed an over-
hauling and revamping; many building improverrents have been put 
off for years. 
One of the troubles has been tre high cost which previous 
recommendations would have meant. So I called together a group 
of outstanding public-spirited private citizens and presented 
them >vith the problem. I asked them to survey the building need 
of the Department of Correction in light of considerations --
our limited state budget arrl also the present and future trends 
in state penology . 
The results were astounding . This fine group came up 1dth 
fon"ard-looking solutions at a winimum cost for Massachusetts . 
The total cost of their recommendations represents a reduction 
of hundreds of thousands of dollars over all previous estimates. 
Their recommendations include a ne>v reformatory for young 
off em ers, the necessary support for a reception-classification 
and detention center, as \'l"ell as the transfer of Bridgewater 
State Hospital for the Criminally Insane to the supervision of 
the Department of l-1ental Health. 
Similarl,y, before I took office in 1957, I made use of the 
volunteer services of many lawyers, economists and educators to 
revie\v, evaluate and reduce budgetary recommendations for fiscal 
1959. 
I have sponsored many other programs through greater citizen 
participation including two Youth Conferences, a Conference on 
the Problems of the Aging, and others. I have tried wherever 
possible to help all of our citizens become more familiar wit h 
the procedures a nd the programs of state government. 
vle have held a number of Executive Council meetings outside of 
Boston in order that people might know their state officials and 
the state government better. Here, for instance, >vas an 
E.""Cecutive Council meeting in • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
I believe that my Citizens' Participation Programs have brought 
great benefits to Massachusetts . He have received immeasurable 
help in promoting the economy of Massachusetts; 1ve have achieved 
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better state programs through the cooperation of state employees 
and private citizens. We have accomplished greater results 
sooner --with great benefits to Hassachusetts and at no cost to 
our taxpayers. And, just as important, we have brought better 
government to you, the citizens of :Hassachusetts. 
APPE ®I:~ C 
EXAllPLE OF A LIVE TELEVISION PROGRAN OF FOS'l'EH FUliCOLO , 
"VACATION INDUSTRY11 1 
iln<'10lmcer : You v'lill hear uhat has been done in the State in the past h '>lo 
years to build the Vacation Industry into a mu~ti-million dollar 
business . You Nill hear about programs for the future that >llill 
bring more out-of-state visitors to our vacation areas and more 
money into our economy . Her e to introduce his guests is the 
Governor of the Commomvealth, Foster Fur colo . 
Governor : Hi -- This is Foster Furcolo. You lmoV>r, the Vacation Industry 
is the third largest business ><re have here in the Connnomiealth . 
And it neans a great deal to all of us vrhether or not 11re are 
directly concerned vdth vacation travel or not, because it ha s 
so many indirect benefits of one kind or another and it bring s 
so many millions and millions of dollars into the State . It 
helps everyone in the State, <·rhether they are directly concerned 
or not . Now, I have here lvith me on this program h ro guests 
·who -- ·well, I suppose they Hon 1t mind i f I say they a re sort of 
experts in this business . On my left is Norman Cook, vJho i s the 
Secretary of the Cape Cod Chamber of Comrnerce. And over on my 
right is J'ohn Dmming , •··Jho comes from the other end of the State, 
and he is the Secret2.ry of the Berkshire Hills Conference . And 
I assume , John, that that is about the equiva.lent of the Chamber 
of Commerce set up out the Berksf1.ire Hills 1t1ay, isn 1 t it? 
Dovming : Yes, it is Governor . 
Governor: Hell noN, perhaps to get this started, Norm, v~hat ·Hould you 
think if , perhaps, v.re went back to a program you and I had some 
tvro years ago ? You see , back a couple of years ago , Norm Cook 
and I appeared on a program vmen I 1vas running for Governor • 
1958 . 
. ll.nd at that time I said t-rhat I -- vlell, instead of my telling 
you v.lhat I said at tha.t time , i'lith the help of those here i n the 
studio, let ' s just play back the exact Herds I had in a 
broadcast here back in 1956. 
lTranscript of a Program ·relecast over \1TNAC- TV, 8 :00 P .N., October 14, 
Downing : 
"Now, if elected Governor, I plan, first of all, to see to it 
that we have effective leadership in the Department of Commerce 
to go out aggressively lookin~ for these tourists for vacation 
business . I think we should spend money in order t o bring in 
money. If you had a business, and you can talk to any business-
man in the world, you will find that you don 't get business 
simply by sitting back an::l. waiting for it. That's as true of the 
vacation business as it is of any other. And I think we s hould 
spend money and aggressively go out and look for that vacation 
business; and it can be done, and it should be done . 11 
1Plell, that's what I said two years ago, and I think 1-ve've done 
it. First of all, as you may know, we established in our 
Department of Conunerce, a Division of Promotion. It was intended 
to actively promote Hassachusetts, as ive have said, as it has 
never been promoted before. In addition to that, we selected the 
Commissioner of Commerce, John Burke. And our 'tiaY of selecting 
him was somewhat unique, I guess, because I didn't simply appoint 
him as Commissiorer of Commerce, but I called him in to assist 
some fifty of the leading citizens in Jlilassachusetts, both 
Republicans and Democrats. And I said, we want a Commissioner 
of Commerce \vho is going to actively bring i ndustry into 
Massachusetts and keep industry here, and we \vant one who is 
goirg to know 1mat it means to actively promote Massachusetts as 
it has never been promoted before. And I think we have 
succeeded, because they came up with John Burke, and I named him 
Commissioner of Commerce. 
Noi'r, I'm taking too much time here. Let's get on to some of the 
experts. Nmv, John Downing , the Secretary of the Berkshire Hills 
Conference, I wonder if you could g ive us any idea at all as to 
i'Ihat we have been doing in the way of vacation travel l iterature . 
-~1d I know you brought in some charts and promotional things, but 
you just go ahead in your own way -- I think that 1-vould be the 
best way to do it. 
~fell, Governor, in keeping your campaign promise of two years 
ago, as our bureaus can see, we have replaced that rather anemic-
looking brochure which used to satisfy for people wno wrote to 
the Corrnnonwealth. \.Ve have replaced it idth a dynamic, four-
color, fort,v -page booklet. The Department has issued a nice 
booklet for our forest and park use. ~ve m ve our first fall 
foliage brochure, salt vm.ter guide, and, as you can see, we cover 
the four seasons in the color brochure. 
Of course, prior to your arrival, Goven1or, the news1~per 
advertising was confined pretty much to an area of within five 
hundred miles of the Commonwealth. Your new dynamic program now 
embraces an area of approximately fifteen hundred miles, which 
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these people in these areas are getting the Hassachusetts story 
through your Department of Commerce. And , of course, Governor, 
you well realize that this is not merely a one or two area 
business. The vacation business in the Conm1onvJealth of 
Massachusetts starts on our Islands of Hartha's Vineyard and 
Nantucket up through Cape Cod, South Shore, the Hub itself, the 
North Shore, right through Central Massachusetts, Pioneer Valley, 
and, of course, mY o~~ beloved Berkshire Hills. 
Governor: vlell nov~·, John, I think that has been very interesting, and I hope 
it is to the listening audience, too, because as you know, \ve have 
to advertise 1'-fassachusetts throughout other sections of the 
country. Otherwise, how do they knovl anything a.t all about our 
wonderful beaches, our great resorts, our historic sites a~d 
shrines, and things of that nature? 
Now, let's go to the other end of the State and back dovm to see 
Norm Cook, the Secretary of the Cape Cod Chamber of Commerce . 
Norm, Jom1 Downing has told us about what he has been doing in the 
way of pamphlets ani literature and advertising, trying to reach 
out ani let people knm'i what vie have here. How effective has it 
been, in your opinion? 
Cook: Govermr, I am pleased to say that it has been very effective. 
Vie t'Vere pleased two years ago when you made a promise, and you 
have kept that promise. Now, we have some very effective ways 
of testjng promotional activities of this type . fu1d there are two 
particular things I toJOuld like to tell you about tonight. 
The first one -- on the Cape vle have developed a bank deposit 
index, and in two years that index has risen ten per cent \vhich 
is outstanding, because 1ve had good seasons before that, but they 
have become progressively better . Now, one of the very effective 
tests is this one -- we can, through our Department, control and 
keep track of where our inquiries come from and hoV>r many there 
are. And you 1r10uld be pleased to see \vhat vre have done over the 
past two years -- to see them rise from forty-seven thousand 
annually to this year one hundred and nineteen thousand -- an 
increase of t-.;v-o hundred and fifty-three per cent in bvo years 
because now >W have an effective program to promote vacation 
travel for Massachusetts. And we are pleased, Governor, 
extremely pleased. 
Governor: That's very interesting, and f or the audience I think that I might 
say this: I've come to learn this since I 1ve become Governor; 
this l119.tter of inquiries and what it means . Actually, you see wh3t 
happens is this: The Department of Commerce receives inquiries 
from many sections of the country, someone from Ohio, or Kansas, 
or lvherever it might be, will ~vrite not only to Hassachusetts but 
to many other states. They might be going to vacation somewhere, 
perhaps take their youngsters, and so they ' ll do as you and I 
might do if -vre \oJ"ere thinking of going to one of several states . 
They write to the Department of Cormnerce of that state . That 
technically is called an inquiry, and under the old system, the 
Department of Comrn.erce here in Jl1assachusetts would simply send 
back an ansv.rer. Now these figures just cited by Norm Cook 
indicate very clearly what's happened as a result of the adver-
tising during this promotional campaign. First of all the number 
of inquiries that we have had in this last year or t11ro has gone 
up by some tvm hundred and fifty-five per cent . As you can see 
from this chart over here -- we 1ll just point at that chart again 
for the moment - - you ' ll s ee that there has been a tremendous 
increase . Back in 1956-1957 about forty-seven thousand people 
were inquiring, that 1 s the figure do\"ln in the lower corner . In 
1957-1958 almost one hundred and twenty thousand people vrere 
inqmrmg . That means that our advertising in these pamphlets 
was very, very successful and effective, and what it means, of 
course, as John Dovming pointed out a feN· moments ago is that 
because of the fact th4t there has been this change in type of 
advertising , and in the method of answering inquiries, >ve are 
better able to show the people in other sections of the state 
what we have here to offer. Now, John, perhaps you might >-rant to 
enlarge on that a little bit because this is your field as to wha 
differences there may have been . 
Downing : ~Jell, Governor, as you can well imagine, inqlllr~es are the life-
blood of the vacation-travel business . i'Jben your Department of 
Commerce receives inquiries, they process them, answer the 
inquirer y.Jith your own Iviassachusetts literature . And within 
tvrenty-four hours, they are in an office such as mine and Norman 
Cook ' s, for our respective area follow-ups. And, of course, that 
is most linportant, because this is a highly competitive situation 
Governor: In other words, it is pretty hard for you, John and you, Norman 
Cook, down in Cape Cod to know "Who to follow-up unless you first 
have the inquiry. 
Cook: It is very necessary that we get an overall campaign from the 
state to help our people. This is an annual type of business in 
that everyone -wants a direct ans1oJ"er; everyone has to be told 
before they come to the Corrunonwealth 1'll"hat vre have to offer and 
how much it 1rill cost. And it is only through inquiries that 
this can be effectively done. 
Governor: 1tTell, I think that is interesting for the fact that those new 
pamphlets we have have done such a job. There is something else 
here that I I\IOuld like to point out for the moment, if I may . I 
am holding up The Ne\'ll" York Times supplement, called 11 J:.1assachusel:;ts 
Means Progress . " Nmv that was put out some time ago, ~-1ay 18, 
1958. This New York Times supplement has been called the finest 
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supplerrent of its kind that any state has ever had . And I will 
tell you l'ihat it does -- knmv what it does. This NevT York Times 
supplement advertises Massachusetts in many other sections of the 
nation. Now I >vill turn to one section of it here, and you can 
see what I mean 1..here it say s, 111·1assachusetts, The Year-Round 
Vacation Land ." And this New York 'l'imes supplement, going to so 
many diff erent sections of the country, points out, and here it 
points out pictures of the Berkshires and v.Jhat we have there. 
It has pictures of beaches, historic sites, and shrines. It has 
some rrnre of the sailing arrl the fishing a nd the boating. It has 
almost everything that l.'le have in great detail and the sarne on 
t he back . Nm-T, here is the interesting thing . This is not only 
a piece of tremendous promotional value, but interestingly 
enough, do you knovr vlhat it cost the ta.."'Cpayers of lc'Iassachusetts? 
Virtually nothing, and let me tell you why. Under our Citizens' 
Participation Program that you have heard about, we said that >'le 
want to advertise Hassachusetts, but we don't want to make the 
taxpayers pay for it. Hh at do we do? Well, 1-Jhat we did 1vas 
this . Vvitb the Department of Conmerce spearheading the drive, 
we went to many public-spirited firms and organizations, and 
instead of costing you the taxpayers hundreds of thousands of 
dollars for the kind of promotional activity in The New York 
Times supplement that it v<ould cost, >-Te managed to get private 
organizations and firms arid others to donate the money, and to 
contribute this, so that you the taxpayers did not have to pay 
it. No-.,.r, isn 1 t t ba t a •·ronderful thing -- promoting 
Massachusetts, bringing in these tourists and vacationers, 
enlarging our vacation business, and doing it at virtually no 
cost at all to the taxpayers? No·w, v1hat does it all mean to us? 
IITell, I guess that these two guests of mine could sum up better 
than I can. But briefly, let me say this --when we bring in 
· millions and millions of vacatione:rS1 money, of course, it means 
a great deal directly to those who eat in restaurants, those who 
buy gasoline in gas stations, those who have stores to vlhich 
these tourists come and buy. It means a great deal to the hotels 
and motels . There is something that I did not understand about 
and it is this: Every time some vacationer goes to some motel 
or hotel on the Cape, Boston, or the ·Berkshires, that motel or 
hotel has to have additional laundry. It has to have additional 
help. It means employment. One hundred vacationers may mean 
additional business for some laundry located somewhere. One 
hundred people buying articles in a store may mean that back 
someplace else, a person vmo does not even know what the vacatio 
business is, is benefiting from i.Dcreased employment. Do you 
know what else it means? They actually brought in, in addition 
to the hundreds of millions of dollars that they spend, the 
vacationers actually paid over ~~4,000 ,000 in taxes last year 
that othe~vise you, the taxpayer, would have had to pay . So, 
that is why it means something to all of us. 
91 
'dell, in conclusion, this is Foster Fur colo . And I vmnt to thank 
Nann Cook, the Secretary of the Ca pe Cod Chamber of Commerce, and 
John Downing, the Secretary of the Berkshire Hills Conference. 
I hope that you have enjoyed listening to this program v-.r:i.th me. 
APPENDIX D 
SAl1J:>LE NE~·JSPAPER C1AHPAIGN ADVE~TISEHENT1 
THE BLACK RECORD 
of CHAS. GIBBONS REPUBLICAN CANDIDATE FOR GOVERNOR! 
SENIOR CITIZENS - HE VOTED AGAINST YOU! 
Charles Gibbons voted against c bill to end discrimination in employment on the basis 
of age; voted against six major bills to increase old age assistance benefits; voted twice 
ogo inst increased food allowances . 
f'J ifid ol Houn~ Journol- 1 9~8 . p. 1843, 1956, p. U<18, 1951 , p. 2145; 1948, p. 339; 1941, f' · .5-I.S; l946, p. 919; 1946, pp. 
'6!~ • Ml , 98 41 
MINORITY GROUPS- HE VOTED AGAINST YOU1 
Charles Gibbons voted six times against legislation outlawing religious and racial 
discrimination in employment; he voted twice aga inst legislation outlawing religious and 
racial discrimination In education . 
IOific io l Hou1e Journal- J 946, pp. I 039, 1101 , ! lOS, 1 I 65; 1945 , pp . I 293, I 297, 1 n91 
HOUSEWIVES - HE VOTED AGAINST YOU! 
Charles Gibbons voted against lower interest rates on small loons; he voted against 
stronger regulot4on of loon sharks; he voted against legislation that would help prevent 
increases in water, gas, electricity and transportation rates. 
!O ffi cio/ Hou n Journ tJ I - 1950 . p 111 0, 1945, pp. 531 , 556, .551, 573, 1950, p. riSI ; 19.56, p . 1637; 19.55, pp. 1477, J7.t91. 
WORKING MEN AND WOMEN- HE VOTED AGAINST YOUI 
Charles G ibbons voted against o 50c minimum wage; voted against Workmen's Compen-
sation bills providing for payment of $3,000 for loss of on arm, $3,500 for loss of a 
leg and $4,000 for loss of on eye; voted against increased Unemployment 
Compensation benefits. 
IOfficto/ HouJe Journol _- 1947, pp 13.5 1, 1602, 109 1, 1093; 195$ , pp. 960, 16691 1941, ,., 17171 19.50, p . 9441 
ON TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 4 VOTE AGAINST THE 
REPUBLICAN CANDIDATE FOR GOVERNOR! 
~he Boston Globe, October 31, 1958, p . 1 . 
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